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On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) was first made aware of 
cases of “viral pneumonia” in Wuhan, China. On January 11, 2020, the WHO received the genetic 
sequence of what was now determined as a novel coronavirus, and the first death was reported. 
Just two days later, the first international case was recorded in Thailand.1 From there, it spread 
worldwide to reach 128,991,488 cases and 2,817,908 deaths globally at time of writing.2 Between 
then and now, countries shut down, economies crashed and the world ground to a halt. It was also 
a time of political reckoning, with governments debating how best to handle their response to such 
an unprecedented pandemic. The global nature of this event has created a real-life experiment in 
pandemic response and should help the world community learn from this experience, the same 
way lessons were learnt and applied after the failures of the international community in keeping 
peace in the lead up to World War II. Of particular interest with the coronavirus pandemic is the 
way governments talked about the crisis. Some countries downplayed the threat whilst others took 
draconian measures. Some governments sent a message to their population to brace for the impact 
of the pandemic, whilst other governments reassured people of their ability to contain the virus. 
Governments adopted varied frames to present the crisis, leading to varied individual 
understandings and responses to the pandemic. 
 
 “The way we say something often matters much more than what we say.”3 This is the 
essence of framing in politics. A frame is a viewpoint or angle with which to approach a particular 
 
1 World Health Organization, ‘Timeline of WHO’s Response to COVID-19’. 
2 Center for Systems Science and Engineering, ‘COVID-19 Map’. 
3 Rathje, ‘The Power of Framing’. 
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issue, “which highlights one aspect of a political issue over another.”4 Frames allow different 
parties to use the same issues for their own political gains, and to propose their own solutions to 
these same issues. For example, both a left- and a right-wing party might agree that a particular 
trade treaty with another country is bad. The left-wing party might say ‘this would allow foreign 
products to flood into our market and bypass our stringent safety standards, hurting our people as 
final consumers who will face dangerous goods’, whilst the right-wing party might raise the same 
objection over a lack of enforcement of standards, but focus instead on local businesses and 
producers that will face unjust competition and higher production costs than their foreign 
counterparts. The problem is the same, but the approach is different, which may well lead to 
different proposed solutions.  
Framing is particularly powerful because it is often done by people in power, like 
politicians or the media, who can share their frames on a large scale, and who often benefit from 
speaking from a respected platform that people trust. In complex crises like with the coronavirus, 
where little information is known about the origin, consequence, or solution to the problem, 
framing becomes a crucial tool in the government’s response arsenal. Individuals do not know how 
to make informed responses to the crisis as public knowledge is lacking, so they turn to their 
government to receive information and instructions. When audience autonomy is limited, 
individuals rely on framing to plan their individual responses.5 Regardless of the laws or budgets 
passed, if a government says publicly that masks are not very important, like many European 
countries did at the beginning, then it is evident that people will follow whatever the government 
said. Framing is also important because it impacts how people perceive the policies the government 
passes, and determines whether or not people feel like these are good policies to be followed or 
 
4 Lecheler, ‘Framing Effects in Political Communication’. 
5 Entman, ‘Framing’. 
 5 
restrictive policies to be ignored. Governments are also usually the first, and at times only ones, to 
receive information in crises, so their frames are seldom challenged in the early stages. Frames 
clarify what the heart of an issue is, and what sort of an issue it is. They also imply the solutions 
that should follow, by creating an easy and narrow narrative that puts aside the broader context or 
opposing arguments. 
 
Selection and salience are key aspects of framing, as the framers pick a specific part of the 
issue they want to highlight, and then bring that to the forefront of the discussion.6 Selection means 
not just what to include, but also what to choose to exclude. The exclusion of frames is just as 
important as inclusions,7 as excluded options will likely never be considered viable or desirable 
by the audience. Salience on the other hand is “making a piece of information more noticeable, 
meaningful, or memorable to audiences.”8 It is telling people why that particular frame is the more 
desirable one, especially when there are competing frames. 
A frame is both a way to present and to understand information.9 A research paper could 
thus either focus on either how the media and government present a particular issue, or focus on 
how the audience and general population understands and interprets that issue. This paper will 
focus on the presentation aspect, looking more at how people acted in response to that frame, rather 
than think about how people understood the frame. In a way, in a crisis it is of secondary 
importance to explore the detailed processes of how people internalize the government’s message, 
and more crucial to assess simply whether or not the government’s attempts at getting people to 





9 Scheufele, ‘Framing as a Theory of Media Effects’. 
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perceive and understand frames in the context of this paper, as this naturally also impacts 
individual decision making as a response to the government’s frames. Furthermore, because of the 
different personal experiences and mindsets individuals have, a frame will work differently on 
different people, and is not guaranteed to have a successful effect on determining how people 
understand an issue.  
The frame can fail at promoting a particular narrative if the language used is not 
convincing, or if it does not correspond enough with the reality of the situation. Generally, the 
more straightforward an issue is, and the more information common people have about that issue, 
the harder it will be for governments to use a particular frame. This is the case because framing 
often requires zones of uncertainty that can be used to steer the discussion one way or the other. If 
there is an increase in drunk-drivers speeding and crashing, a politician could frame it as either a 
drinking problem, or a speeding problem, as it is not clear what the problem is, nor what the best 
solution should be. If there is only an increase in speeding crashes, with all drivers being sober, 
the public would find it harder to agree with a politician blaming the increase in crashes on alcohol. 
The high uncertainty around the coronavirus pandemic broadly resulted in governments initially 
being able to use the frames they wanted, as the public did not have enough information to critically 
assess the government’s frame.   
 
Security framing and the emphasis of foreign security threats is not a new tool for 
governments to unite their populations under a common cause, and for those governments to justify 
the sacrifices it asks of its citizens. The US’s Patriot Act could not have been passed without the 
calls from politicians that it was a necessary measure to protect Americans from global terrorism. 
In Russia, Putin remains popular because he represents a safeguard against American and 
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European aggression. It is usually following wars or acts of terrorism that presidential approval 
ratings increase, because these events allow everyone to agree that the country’s socioeconomic 
divisions must be put aside temporarily to face the growing security threats. The use of a security 
frame creates a sense of danger and urgency. The implication in such a frame is that if people want 
to regain a feeling of safety, they must trust and support their government to be strong and quick 
in their response to the crisis.  
On the other hand, health crises are not traditionally portrayed through a security lens. 
Health issues fail to grab headlines, with violent acts dominating the public dialogue because of 
their sensationalist nature. The media heavily reports on the latter acts because they attract more 
attention. A car bomb in a major city is more interesting to many than another thousandth death 
from an opioid overdose. Simultaneously, the minister of defence has always ranked higher than 
the minister of health. However, this does not mean that health issues cannot be framed through a 
security lens. The War on Drugs in the 1970s in the US is a clear example of that, with Ronald 
Reagan portraying this health issue as an issue of crime and violence, to be treated through harsh 
policing. The drug issue was framed by Reagan as a security issue for very political reasons, as 
this allowed him to target minorities and remain in good standing with voters who put high 
importance on ‘law and order’. Nevertheless, 50 years later there is a mountain of evidence that 
shows how counter-productive this security framing was, along with the accompanying 
criminalisation and militarisation of the response. Focussing on drug dealing gangs did nothing to 
reduce drug usage or drug violence. Countries that did frame drug abuse as a socio-economic issue, 
like Portugal that decriminalised all drugs, that focussed on the root causes of drug use, such as 
homelessness or poor mental health, are the countries that have had the best outcomes. De-
criminalising, not automatically involving the police, and not treating the topic as one of violent 
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danger, is what actually ensured that people co-operated with authorities and sought the help they 
needed.   
 
In the context of the coronavirus, as the virus started spreading the first months of 2020, 
already it became apparent how differently some countries were choosing to frame and talk about 
it. Asian countries, who were the first affected as the virus began spreading from China, had 
already faced similar diseases and government officials there knew how to talk specifically about 
pandemics and issues of health. Governments there took an alarmist stance, urged people to take 
it seriously, and demonstrated how ready and aware of the dangers they were. Meanwhile, Western 
countries did not have such recent experience with viral diseases. However, they had faced many 
recent violent terrorist attacks, and government there knew how to talk about threats with a 
particular security frame, emphasising a strong response, asking for national unity, and urging 
people not to fear the threat. In both Asian and Western countries, initial responses to the pandemic 
and to framing relied on using pre-existing frameworks and frames that governments were familiar 
with. This fits in with standard human psychology, in that people apply pre-existing knowledge 
and solution to both new and old problems, before thinking about new approaches.  
Given the scale of the coronavirus and the huge necessary public implication in the fight 
against it, one could understand why countries’ governments would have opted to present the issue 
as a national security issue. This would have united people, made them aware of the importance 
of working together with each other and with the government, and given people a reason to follow 
the government’s guidelines. Acting as rational self-preserving beings, if the government says 
“please do this because it is good for the wellbeing of others”, it should be much less likely to elicit 
a strong personal response than a message of “please do this because otherwise you will die”. A 
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security framing has the advantage of making everyone believe that they are potential victims too. 
The average person may not care much for policies that reduce drug overdoses or fund soup 
kitchens, because they do not use drugs and have a secure job, and as such feel like these issues 
do not affect them. However, the fear of a random terrorist attack or mass shooting is one that can 
affect anyone, as there is greater perceived randomness with these events. No one is safe from a 
security risk. 
Furthermore, security framing puts the blame on outside forces. One might think “there is 
no need for myself as an individual to do much, as the problem is not me or my actions. All I need 
to do is support my country and my government and together we will succeed”. It also puts a lot 
of responsibility on the government. A socioeconomic framing on the other hand tends to ask for 
individual actions, for people to re-think how they run their daily life, and for people to think about 
the way their life choices and interactions impact that of others.  
 
With health guidelines, it does not take orders from the government to act upon them. 
People recycle not because the government threatens to fine them if they do not, but because people 
have a genuine interest in ecology and the socio-economic issue it represents. Similarly, many 
people do not recycle simply because they do not care, and they see it as someone else’s problem. 
With the coronavirus, many people did not wait for their government to issue mask mandates to 
start wearing masks, or for their government to impose lockdowns to self-restrict their movements. 
In some countries today we are seeing people going above and beyond what their government is 
mandating, staying indoor when their government says they can go out. In others, people are 
fighting against the government’s rules and doing everything they can to avoid them, going out as 
much as they can when their government asks them to stay in.  
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The social contract is built in large part around the idea that the government exists to protect 
people from physical threats. Issues like education and healthcare are secondary, and can only 
come after security has been achieved. Even proponents of small government are usually 
favourable of high security spending. The coronavirus is as deadly and as challenging to address 
as any traditional physical threat, and yet it does not fit within the traditional definition of a 
physical threat. That makes it so hard for government to create consensus and convince people to 
follow the rules.  
 
 
This thesis aims to explore how countries’ governments actually did frame the coronavirus 
pandemic during the first months of the crisis, and the impact this had on these countries’ 
populations’ personal responses and compliance with health guidelines. Is there something in the 
way governments presented the coronavirus that had an impact on people’s reactions to 
coronavirus-related policies? And how does a government’s decision to frame the coronavirus 
more as a security issue than a socio-economic issue have an impact on people’s actions and 
receptions to government policies? To do this, I created an index of framing to compare countries 
on a set list of issues, to identify how much of a security frame they used. By asking specific 
questions about the way a country presented the coronavirus, each answer gives a country a certain 
point, and the total of all of these points, or the total of all of the questions that form my index, 
gives the index score.  
 
This paper will focus on the early period of the pandemic as there seems to have been a 
convergence of discourses with time, as more and more governments adopt a socioeconomic frame 
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as they realized how unhelpful their original security framing was. As scientific information about 
the coronavirus becomes more available and more accurate, the response to it has also become less 
of a political issue and more of a scientific fact, though it naturally remains a large part of political 
debates in many countries. It is also crucial to evaluate the early period of a government’s 
pandemic response, as this is what strongly determines whether countries escaped or heavily 
suffered from the coronavirus. Most countries with low case numbers now are those that have 
maintained low rates from the beginning. Furthermore, research on framing seems to indicate that 
its effects are quite short-term, lasting 2-3 weeks after initial exposure.10 Though I use no set cut-
off date for my analysis, as the virus hit different countries at different periods and in different 
waves, I generally restrict my analysis to the first half of 2020, with a specific focus on January-
May 2020. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, is an explanation of the methodology of the index, what the index 
is and how it was built, along with the sources used. Chapter 3 begins with the complete index 
along with corresponding quotes for both the US and Japan is then presented, so as to give readers 
an example of what the index looks like when applied to real-life countries and help readers 
understand how the index works. The next section of Chapter 3 introduces the dependent variables 
of compliance and personal understanding/reactions to the pandemic. I talk about these dependent 
variables and how they corelate with the framing index, and what this means more broadly about 
the framing of pandemic. I then go into a longer discussion of what I found out through the research 
and exploration I carried out in this project and what framing does allow us to understand. Chapter 
 
10 Lecheler, ‘Framing Effects in Political Communication’. 
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4 moves on to an extensive case study on the US to put it all in context and show readers what 








The main part of my analysis is a framing index I constructed, to evaluate and compare how 
much of a security frame different governments around the world used. I restrict my comparative 
analysis to 10 high-income countries with advanced economies and advanced health care systems, 
to reduce differences in people’s reactions and perceptions of the coronavirus pandemic that may 
be caused by income levels, education levels, or accessibility to quality healthcare. 
 
2.1 – What is a security frame? 
 
I define a security frame as having four main elements: 
1. A government response that focuses on a small expert-led response, rather than one that 
would require wide population involvement 
 
Modern militaries are made up of small elite voluntary forces, and long gone are the days of 
mass conscription. Similarly, national defence is guaranteed by professional elite agencies, funded 
and maintained by the government, to look over us and protect us. The public is thus not expected 
to partake directly in defence efforts, because the government and its agencies will take care of it. 
This also means that individuals do not need to make efforts in addressing the issue, as the 
government promises to step up and take care of it. For example, we do not expect average people 
to have any active role in tackling terrorism. In a socio-economic frame, we expect the solution to 
come from a population-wide solution, one that involves community involvement in tandem with 
the government. For example, tackling climate change involves individual changes like recycling 
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or switching to electric vehicles, even if recycling and electric cars requires infrastructure only the 
government can build. A socio-economic approach to drug dependence involves reducing societal 
stigmas, teaching community members how to use naloxone, and placing community organisations 
as the most visible and first point of contact. A security frame by contrast requires little to no 
involvement from the public, and allows individuals to keep on living as they always do.  
In the context of the coronavirus, a security frame can be interpreted as the belief that 
individuals do not need to change their habits, such as restricting movements or imposing mask 
mandates, as the government will manage to solve the pandemic on their own. The response is 
paternalistic not in the sense that the dad of the household tells his children what to do, but that the 
dad of the household takes it upon himself to solve the problem without having to involve the 
children in it. 
 
2. A focus on the material aspect of the response, with an assumption that more money and 
more resources thrown at the problem is the best solution 
 
Continuing with the first point, a small professional security apparatus is one that heavily relies 
on technology and resources to amplify the government response. The over-reliance on resources 
and the false belief that any problem can be solved with enough money can be seen in the US’ 
recent military interventions in the Middle East, and even going as far back as the Vietnam War. 
In these cases, the US ignored the human and social aspect of the conflict, and assumed that 
bombing the enemy into submission would be a sufficient medium- and long-term strategy. A 
socio-economic frame emphasises the human aspect of the response, and acknowledges that the 
problem is not just financial or resource-based, but that it may also stem from societal norms, 
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stigmas, or a lack of human capital such as insufficient hospital workers. A socio-economic frame 
also deems that success is not dependent on the absolute amount of money and material resources 
invested, but more on the quality of that investment and the ways in which these material resources 
are integrated with human and community resources.  
The recent debate around defunding police forces in the US is a perfect example of the security 
versus socio-economic framing of resource use. The traditional security approach to policing has 
been one that emphasises massive police budgets and the use of high-tech equipment, and one that 
increased budgets and the use of material resources whenever crime rates did not go down. The 
socio-economic approach that is being talked about is one that rejects the assumption of the 
security frame that money leads to success, and that instead tries to focus resources on community 
and human-centred approaches.  
When thinking about the coronavirus, a technology-heavy and resource-heavy approach to 
crisis-resolution is one that would over-emphasise claims of ‘miracle cures’ and have vaccines be 
the main tool against the virus. A security frame for the coronavirus also ignores the broader social 
and economic impact that everyday people feel, such as unemployment, worsening mental health, 
or children stuck at home and unable to socialise or go to school.  
 
3. A need for the government to remain strictly in control and on top of the situation 
 
In a security frame, the threat is minimised not so much to stop people from panicking, but to 
hide the fact that the response to the threat is insufficient, to avoid losing face in front of the public. 
If the press reports on the government not doing anything about an issue commonly framed as a 
socio-economic one, such as homelessness or unemployment, it just shows elitism and a lack of 
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heart from the government. If the press reports on the government not doing anything about an 
issue commonly framed as a security issue, such as terrorism or rising crime, it shows a 
powerlessness and weakness. Governments do not like appearing weak, and there no better way 
to appear weak than by losing a war. A government that approaches the coronavirus through a 
security frame will thus be less reluctant to lie and manipulate data, will push aside doctors and 
health experts that may be too realistic and alarmist, and will be sure to control the narrative so as 
to embellish the government’s actions and coronavirus record. 
 
4. An assumption from the government that the usual military and security state apparatus 
will be able to solve the problem 
 
The most visible and obvious part of a security frame, the one that people will likely be most 
receptive to and internalise, is the level of involvement of the army, police, and broader security 
apparatus in responding to the crisis. The state has the monopoly of violence, and it exercises that 
monopoly through the security apparatus. Using soldiers or police officers to help with crisis 
response thus sends a strong signal, even if the army might be commonly used for regular disaster 
relief. Furthermore, a government using a security frame will not show reluctance to send the army, 
but instead present it as the natural first step and the natural solution to resolving the problem. My 
index will thus look at both the actions carried out by the army, along with how the government 





2.2 – The Index 
 
The index is made up of a list of 11 questions, with each question being answered by a score of 
either 1 if the answer is one that suggests a security frame was used, and 0 if it suggests a security 
frame was not used. There can also be a 0.5 if the situation is a bit ambiguous. For example, a 
government that might frequently compare the coronavirus to fighting a war would receive a score 
of 1 for Question 2, a government that has never compared it to a war would receive a score of 0, 
and a government that has compared it only once or twice would receive a score of 0.5 The list of 






(Note: colour coding is for legibility and has no meaning) 
Index 
number 
Short descriptor Question the index point seeks to answer 
1 Attitude to foreign entities' responsibility 
Did the government blame other countries for the 
pandemic? 
2 Comparisons to war 
Did the government compare the coronavirus crisis to 
being at war, or say that the country is at war against 
the coronavirus? (Alludes to war mobilisation) 
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3 Comparisons to terrorism/domestic attack 
Did the government compare the coronavirus to being 
hit by terrorism/being the victim of a violent attack? 
(The threat is coming from outside, it is us vs them, and 
we are victims) 
4 Hidden leadership 
Who takes major decisions? Is it a Council of Defence, 
a Council of Health? Is it made up of primarily doctors, 
or experts from the national security apparatus? 
5 Visible leadership 
Who makes major speeches? Is it the President, the 
Minister of Health? What place do health experts have 
in official government communications? 
6 Name of laws passed 
What were the names of major 
laws/proclamations/actions passed to combat COVID? 
7 Publicity around the army’s intervention 
How did the government present the army's 
role/actions in tackling the crisis? ("We chose to send 
the army because they can do it" vs "sending the army 
was really our last choice" 
8 Resource management 
Was there an emphasis on viewing medical supplies as 
"strategic resources" or needing to mobilise industry to 
gain strategic independence? (The same way countries 
often talk about petrol, steel or armaments) 
9 Use of war-time acts 
Were war-time acts (e.g.: Defence Production Act, or 
state of emergency) used? 
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10  Army’s intervention 
How big of a role did the armed forces have in early 
COVID response? (This only considers actions that 
could equally be handled by civilian agencies. For 
example, the repatriation of citizens living abroad by 
using a military plane is justified, as it is the norm for 
the army to step up in these cases) 
11  Army’s social media 




My methodology is inspired by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EUI) Democracy Index, 
which aims to give countries around the world a democracy score by asking about 130 questions 
on various aspects of a country’s democratic processes and institutions. I use a binary 1-0 score to 
minimise potential biases and the complex task of judging how much or how little a government 
might engage in a certain behaviour. The score of 0.5 helps for ambiguous cases, and is also used 
by the EUI. To come up with an overall score to compare countries, I simply add up the score of 
each index question for a given country. That way, each country will end up with a final score 
between 0-11, and will be compared on the same issues.  
An advantage of my methodology is the way it facilitates comparisons by focussing on 
specific actions and words, and only trying to find out whether these actions and words were 
present. I do try to consider national specificities in the cases where national laws or traditions 
make it so that specific laws or specific actions will always occur a certain way, regardless of the 
issue, which may falsely make it appear that a government is using a security frame. If it is clear 
that a government had no choice or leeway in their actions, I take that into consideration and look 
at actions for which it is more obvious they had a say in. 
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 I answer the index questions by analysing a host of sources such as: government speeches, 
government reports, government websites, newspapers relaying government speeches and actions. 
My main approach was a thorough reading of all speeches and publications made by the head of 
government of the studied country in the January-May/April 2020 period, looking for phrases and 
keywords that allude to war and security, such as the words “frontline”, “soldiers”, “battle”, “war”, 
“mobilisation”, “sacrifice”, “duty” (more so towards the nation than towards others), 
“sovereignty”, “enemy”, “victory”, “defeat”, “security”, “strategic” (especially when talking about 
stocks or supplies). The broader context and meaning the sentence is also considered and 
commented upon.  
The timeframe studied is not strict, because the pandemic affected different countries at 
different times, and after reading enough speeches a trend in framing often becomes apparent. 
However, I focus on the early period of the pandemic to focus on early response, and to minimise 
the impact that the intensity of the pandemic may have had on framing. It could be that countries 
that had more cases were more inclined to use sensationalist security frames. By focussing on the 
first months of the crisis, I analyse a time period in which all countries had relatively low case 
numbers, or were only facing their first wave. It was a time of equal uncertainty for all countries.  
 For the specific question of the army’s social media, I focussed on Instagram because the 
combination of captions, hashtags and picture provide greater context and information, and which 
help better understand the message the army tries to send. It seems also that generally, the accounts 
of armed forces on Instagram get more or as many followers as those on other social media sites 
(such as Facebook or Twitter), so by analysing the Instagram accounts I am sure to look at a 
popular means of communication for the army. 
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 The index also has the potential of being expended by adding more questions to it, or by 
simply applying it to more countries. I had to limit myself in how many countries I analyse because 
of time constraints in filling in the index for each country. I also had to limit myself because I 
extend my analysis to look at popular compliance and popular response to the pandemic, and I 
found it easier to naturally control for variables like education or income by only comparing similar 
countries. The index however could be used for other analytical purposes or comparisons, similarly 
to how the Democracy Index or the Global Health Security Index, also designed by the EUI, are 
used today.  
 
2.3 – Possible limitations 
 
As I am looking at framing and its impacts on popular compliance and popular response, 
only the more visible aspects of a government’s frame are relevant. As such, for example if I can 
find evidence that the top members of the government did compare the coronavirus to a war, then 
that is evidence enough to suggest that in that respect, the government did use a security frame. If 
I cannot find anything about a government comparing the coronavirus to a war, I cannot prove that 
the government never did do such a comparison. However, if a thorough Internet search for major 
news articles and a reading of major government speeches cannot find any such language, that is 
evidence enough that no such government comparisons to war have found their way into the main 
public scene and the main public discourse.  
I only speak English and French, so I was limited to translated sources for my analysis of 
Sweden and Japan. Thankfully, these governments do a tremendous job of translating virtually all 
government speeches and statements into English, so I am confident that my analysis of these 
 22 
countries did not fail to accurately understand these countries’ frames. However, there may be 
language nuances lost in translation. For example, Abe of Japan frequently talked about avoiding 
an “explosion” of cases, though I cannot be sure whether he intentionally wanted to make it sound 
violent, or whether the original Japanese words is less militaristic. For Instagram posts of the 
Swedish and Japanese armed forces, I had to rely on less-than-optimal auto-translations. 
 My potential biases should also be considered. As a young adult who spent the pandemic 
in both the US and in France, having been personally affected by the policy choices in both 
governments, I have a lot of personal opinions about the pandemic and the way governments 
responded to it. However, I strived to keep these opinions out of my analysis and out of my data 
gathering for the index. By giving specific quotes and clarifications for each index point and index 
score, I ensure the reader can understand my reasoning and hopefully come to the same conclusion 




3. Data and Analysis 
 
I include here the complete index for Japan and the US, along with the citations and quotes I used 
to determine index score, to help the reader visualise and better understand what each index 
question represents and aims to assess. Due to lack of space, the full questions are not included in 
the table and can be referred back to in the methodology section. Specific sources have also not 
been included here, though they can be found in the Excel sheet. 
 
I highly encourage readers to explore the indices for the other countries to understand what 
governments were saying, and in what context those words and speeches took place.  
 














There was actually a strong emphasis on recognising that anyone could get the virus, 
and that the priority was not alienating others, but working together towards 
reducing community spread. For example, Abe said "We have a strong sense of fear 
towards viruses we cannot see; I feel the same as you. At the same time, I strongly 
fear such feelings of unease could lead to discrimination against others or actions 
that reject others."  
When considering other countries, Abe also talked about the need to recognise that 
the problem was a global one, and that success for Japan could only be achieved 
through success for the world. He did not blame specific countries, or imply that it 
was someone else's problem. For example, Abe said that "this is most certainly not 
someone else’s problem. Japan could face the same situation in a short time.”  
To add onto the point above, Abe also said, "We must not be absorbed in addressing 
issues in our own country exclusively. I believe we cannot resolve this global issue 






Abe said that "fighting an enemy hard to see and hard to understand is not easy." 
The invisible enemy is similar to what Donald Trump said.  
Abe also said that Japan "cannot win this battle through the capacity of government 







After analysing the speeches made by Abe Shinzo on the topic of COVID during 
the Jan-May 2020 period, I found no evidence that the Japanese Government 







The main group of decision makers is called the "Novel Coronavirus Response 
Headquarters" and is part of the PM's office. It is chaired by the Deputy Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, vice chaired by the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (in charge 
of internal affairs), Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (in charge of foreign affairs), 
Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (in charge of situation response and crisis 
management), Cabinet Deputy Director (Assistant Secretary of the Cabinet 
Secretariat) and Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare Medical Technology 
Supervisor. 
 
Amongst the list of other members, security apparatus members include the Cabinet 
Deputy Director (National Security Agency), National Police Agency Security 
Bureau Chief, Deputy Director-General of Cyber Security and Policy Planning, 
Ministry of Defense Minister's Secretariat Hygiene Supervisor, and the General 
Manager, Joint Staff Office, Ministry of Defense. However, it seems that the Novel 
Coronavirus Headquarters is more a way to get different ministries to talk to each 
other and work together, and as such its membership is very diverse and seems to 
include second-level ministry officials from all ministries. It is especially interesting 
to see that from the Ministry of Defense, one of the representatives is specifically 
the Hygiene Supervisor for that ministry.  
Overall, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare led the charge  
The Novel Coronavirus Expert Meeting is an advisory body to help guide the Novel 
Coronavirus Headquarters. Its 12 members are made up of 11 health experts and 1 





Most speeches were made either by the PM, by the Minister of Health, Labour and 
Welfare, or by a health expert. Health experts had a lot of space to speak publicly 




 Name of laws 
passed 
0 
The main legal response of the government was done through the "Act on Special 
Measures for Pandemic Influenza and New Infectious Diseases Preparedness and 
Response." The law was originally passed in 2012, and its provisions were used in 
the context of COVID. 
When the government did issue a "state of emergency", it explained on its corona 
website that "This declaration of state of emergency is not intended to stop most of 
the socio-economic activities, but rather to focus on situations with a high risk of 
infection and to ensure effective and targeted countermeasures." It thus frames it 








The only mention I could find of the government talking about how they "mobilized 
the Self-Defense Forces to drastically reinforce our countermeasures at the 
borders." This seems a bit odd, as normally borders are managed by the Immigration 
Bureau, which is part of the Ministry of Justice. Japan having no land borders, does 
not really need soldiers to watch the border. In that context, it seems the government 
chose to send the army, and did not show reluctance. 
Despite the quite sizeable role of the SDF, the government talked very little about. 
When military nurses were sent to help hospitals in Hokkaido, a local official said 
"We take it very seriously that members of the SDF were sent here as their dispatch 





Abe said "In the fight against the novel coronavirus, medical masks, sanitizers, 
medical gowns, as well as ventilators—these are all vital items for healthcare 
workers on the frontline." 
Yet, the government's approach to increase production was through increased 
subsidies and through deregulation, so it did not really approach stock management 






The state of emergency was issued, but it was "Pursuant to Article 32, Paragraph 1 
of the Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza and New Infectious 
Diseases Preparedness and Response (Act No. 31 of 2012), [that] the government 
has declared a state of emergency in relation to the novel coronavirus disease". It 
thus used a specifically health-related law. 
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Considering the state of emergency, the government made it clear that it was for 
implemented for socio-economic reasons, to make it easier for the government to 
spend money to help businesses and employees, and to make it easier for the 
government to ask people to limit their movements. The government did make clear 
that it would not actually impose any restrictions or lockdowns. The Japanese 





The SDF took a significant role in managing the Diamond Princess cases in 
February by deploying 2700 troops, and then hosted COVID patients at a SDF 
hospital. They also helped with quarantines at Narita Airport, with transportation of 
patients within Japan, and went to Miyagi and Tokyo to help prevent infections 
there. For each of these operations, the operation was presented as "Disaster Relief," 






The aerobatics squadron did a fly by and demonstration in honour of Japan's 
healthcare workers, and this was shared on the Instagram and Youtube accounts of 
the SDF air force. However, this was in June 2020, so not at the beginning of the 
pandemic. On the SDF air force account, there was nothing else about the pandemic. 
Between January and April 2020, the SDF ground forces did not post anything on 
Instagram. When they did begin resuming posting, after a post about the enrolment 
ceremony, there were seven posts about how to wash your hands, how to wear a 
mask, how to sneeze in a tissue, how to don on a full biohazard protective gear, etc. 
Then they went back to just posting about tanks and explosions and did not mention 
the virus again. The posts about the virus were more PSA than "this is what the 





















White House website lists as achievement:  
* Halted American funding to the World Health Organization to counter its egregious 
bias towards China that jeopardized the safety of Americans 
Letter from Trump blaming the WHO for not doing anything and for being a puppet of 
China 
White House website lists as an achievement: 
 * Took action to authorize visa sanctions on foreign governments who impede our 
efforts to protect American citizens by refusing or unreasonably delaying the return of 
their own citizens, subjects, or residents from the United States  
* Reached bilateral agreements with Mexico and Canada to suspend non-essential 
travel and expeditiously return illegal aliens  
* In other words the two lines above mean "we need to get rid of foreigners to protect 
ourselves from COVID" *  





Trump said “It’s a medical war. We have to win this war" 
Trump said “I view it as a, in a sense, a wartime President” 
Trump said "I view the invisible enemy [coronavirus] as a war" 
Secretary Azar called the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps "America’s 
public health warriors." And he isn't wrong, because they are a uniformed corp. 
Mike Pence wrote an op-ed titled "We Need the American People’s Help to Fight 
Coronavirus Now" 
In a speech, Trump said: "I would like to begin by announcing some important 
developments in our war against the Chinese virus. We’ll be invoking the Defense 








Trump said "This is worse than Pearl Harbor, this is worse than the World Trade 
Center. There's never been an attack like this.” However, this seems to be the only time 
he made such comparisons, with most comparisons between COVID-19 deaths and the 
9-11 attacks being made by the media. 
Most of the comparisons of the coronavirus to a terrorist attack or to a violent attack 
came from the media, who often compared coronavirus deaths to the death toll of 9-11 





The White House Coronavirus Task Force was in charge. Security roles included: 
National Security Adviser, DHS Deputy Secretary, Deputation National Security 
Adviser. There was a team of medical advisers, but it was often commented on the fact 
they were pushed aside and ignored. 
Trump put Mike Pence in charge of the COVID Task Force because he deemed Pence 





The Secretary of HHS, the Director of the CDC, Dr Fauci and Dr Birx were given quite 
some space in the very beginning to talk, but as soon as cases started increasing and 
community spread became prevalent, the White House restricted and dominated the 
narrative. 
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Name of laws 
passed 
0 
Most of the focus seemed to be on the CARES Act, which is named intentionally to 







There seemed to be no shame in using the Defence Production Act or in sending the 
army to help in New York. These were some of the first steps the government enacted, 
and felt much more like Plan A than Plan B. The army was sent before there were 





It is called the "Strategic National Stockpile," and the government used the Defense 
Production Act (a war-time act) to increase production. 
The discussion seemed more about bringing back industries back to the US for 
economic reasons, rather than guaranteeing strategic independence. It was all quite 
factual too, in the sense that the dialogue was "we are working hard to get more supplies 






White House website lists as an achievement: 
 * Declared COVID-19 a National Emergency under the Stafford Act Note that the 
Stafford Act is NOT a war-time act, but instead an act specific for natural disasters 
White House website lists as an achievement: 
 * Invoked the Defense Production Act over 100 times to accelerate the development 
and manufacturing of essential material in the USA * Signed an executive order 
invoking the Defense Production Act to ensure that Americans have a reliable supply 





White House website lists as an achievement: 
 * Deployed Federal Task Force Strike Teams to provide onsite technical assistance 
and education to nursing homes experiencing outbreaks  
Note that these "task force strike teams" (which sound like SEAL Team 6 going to hit 
terrorists abroad) were made up of doctors and nurses to help nursing homes. The name 
chosen it very militaristic 
Achievements listed on the White House website include: 
 * The Army Corps of Engineers built 11,000 beds, distributed 10,000 ventilators, and 
surged personnel to hospitals 
* Converted the Javits Center in New York into a 3,000-bed hospital, and opened 
medical facilities in Seattle and New Orleans 
* Dispatched the USNS Comfort to New York City, and the USNS Mercy to Los 
Angeles 
* Deployed thousands of FEMA employees, National Guard members, and military 
forces to help in the response * Announced Federal support to governors for use of the 
National Guard with 100 percent cost-share * Delivered $81 million for increased 
inspections and funded 35,000 members of the National Guard to deliver critical 





The US Army Instagram account had video posts with the Chief of Staff and the 
Secretary of the Army talking, and they said things like "tip of the spear of this fight 
for our neighbourhoods" against "an invisible enemy", using the "best of America" to 
"defeat the virus, and they will." This was said in March 2020, and there is not just the 
message of fighting the virus, but also the notion that the army can and will win. 
The US Army launched a hashtag #ArmyCOVID19Fight. There was also 
#KILLthevirus #fightthevirus #VictoryStartsHere 
Whereas in Canada the Instagram accounts of the Armed Forces re-used posters and 
infographics from the central federal government to promote social distancing and 
mask wearing, the US Army had its own infographics with its own visual identity. 
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A lot of the posts were PSAs and announcements of what the army is doing to protect 
its troops/employees from the virus. 
Most of the posts were not very militaristic, though the militarism came in the speeches 
of the leaders (eg: Chief of Staff, Secretary of the Army) and in the hashtags. The 





3.3 – Dependent variable analysis 
 
The independent variable is the framing index. I use four dependent variables to look at simple 
health outcomes, at compliance with health measures, and at cohesion and unity between the 
government and its people. The four dependent variables I use are the Covid Performance Index, 
a measure of perception of government handling, a measure of perception of confidence in 
authorities, and a measure of how much people avoided crowded places. I will explain in their 
respective sections how these variables are constructed and what they represent. A higher score in 
all four variables is a better score. For all variables, I use a scatter plot graph with framing index 
on the X axis and the dependent variable on the Y axis. The aim is not to look for a definite causal 
relationship, so more advanced statistical methods would not be useful. What a scatter plot does 
allow us to see is whether a correlation exists, which can then be explored though a qualitative 


















Sweden 1 56 71 58 65 
Japan 1.5 50 72 39 45 
Canada 2.5 40 83 78 80 
France 6.5 15 79 37 56 
USA 8 17 71 47 60 
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Covid Performance Index 
The Covid Performance Index was compiled by the Lowy Institute, and as the name 
indicates, is a measure of how well a country performed during the pandemic. It combines 
confirmed cases, confirmed deaths, confirmed cases per million people, confirmed deaths per 
million people, confirmed cases as a proportion of tests, and tests per thousand people. Fewer 
deaths, fewer case, and a greater number of tests all indicate success in handling the pandemic. 
Countries were assessed over the 36 weeks following the 100th case. A score of 100 is a perfect 
score, and the top three scoring countries are New Zealand (94.4), Vietnam (90.8) and Taiwan 
(86.4). I use this index as a measure of raw health outcomes, to see how framing correlates with 
health outcomes. It ignores whether framing may have had an impact on popular compliance, and 
instead aims to see simply whether less people died. I rounded the Covid Performance Index to 
the nearest whole number for simplicity, as my analysis only looks for a general trend and would 
not be affected by a few decimal points.11 
 
 



























Fig 1: Covid Performance Index
 33 
A simple glance at the graph lets us see a strong correlation between Covid Performance 
and framing index. This implies that countries that framed the crisis more in a security lens had 
worse health outcomes, with more deaths, more cases, and less tests. We could theorise that the 
relationship between framing and health outcomes is as follows: 
 
 
However, there was nothing in my research that suggested that this was the case. Instead, 
reading numerous government documents gave me an insight not just into how governments 
framed the pandemic, but also into the actual measures they were taking to mitigate the pandemic, 
and the discussions they were having with other actors that could help in the endeavour, such as 






Governments that understood the pandemic in the right terms saw that it was a socio-
economic crisis and a health crisis, and took the right steps from the start to include their 
populations in the response and protect them from possible economic or social hardships that 
mitigation measures may entail. Understanding the pandemic meant that the most effective 
Strong security frame Poor health outcomes 
Appropriate 




Good health outcomes 
Weak security frame 
 34 
mitigation strategies were employed, which naturally led to better health outcomes. 
Simultaneously, it meant that governments did not view the pandemic as a security issue and were 
thus likely to speak about it as it were a security issue. Understanding the pandemic also made the 
virus and the ordeal less scary for governments and populations, making it less important to blindly 
emphasise sacrifice or unity, as the governments generally understood the sort of actions it would 
require from its citizens, and communicate on those clearly and transparently from the beginning.  
It can be concluded that while the use of a security frame is not conductive to better or 
worse health outcomes, the heavy use of a security frame is representative and symptomatic of a 
governmental misunderstanding of the health crisis, which increases the chance that the 
government fails to adopt the right mitigation measures. It would be very interesting to see if this 





The measure of perception of government handling, and of perception of confidence in 
authorities, come from YouGov polls. The first measure is the percentage of people who think the 
government is handling the issue of coronavirus "very" or "somewhat well". The second measure 
is the percentage of people who have "a lot" or "a fair amount" of confidence in the health 
authorities to respond to the coronavirus. The third measure is the percentage of people who say 
they are “avoiding crowded places”. Unlike the Covid Performance Index, these measures try to 
see whether there is a correlation between framing and popular understanding and actions toward 
the pandemic. Polls were conducted every week or so depending on the country. My analysis and 
data gathering for the index does not aim to provide a discussion to explain weekly fluctuations, 
so I averaged the poll results over the March 10 – May 21, 2020 period to get an average result 
that represents the general sentiment over that time period.12  
I use the measure of avoiding crowded places as a proxy for compliance with health 
measures. I tried to also use the prevalence of wearing masks, but some countries had mandated 
mask wearing whilst others had not, leading to Sweden having a 10% mask wearing rate because 
it was not mandatory there, with France having an 80% mask wearing rate people not wearing a 
mask there would land people with a 135€ fine. This would have made comparisons unfair and of 
little use. Furthermore, this presupposes that compliance is a good thing and that governments 
gave the right advice to citizens. There are some examples in the first stages of the pandemic where 
people would have been better off not listening to their governments, such as when the French 
government told people that masks were not useful. However, it is generally true that all 
governments did move toward giving good advice and recommendations, and thus that greater 
 
12 ‘COVID-19 Public Monitor’. 
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compliance is positive. Additionally, if we think about compliance from a government’s 
perspective, compliance is desired regardless of the soundness of the advice. Analysing the link 
between compliance and framing thus helps us understand how effective the government was at 
transmitting its message and making its case to the public.  
 Confidence in health authorities and approval of government handling of the crisis are 
proxies for the connection and trust between the public and health authorities. If confidence and 
approval are both high, it can be assumed that the government’s communication strategy is 
effective and that its frame touches people convincingly, thus leading to more compliance with the 
government’s coronavirus regulations. Measuring how people view the government’s performance 
is useful because ultimately, framing is an issue of words and perceptions. If death rate was high 
but the government employed a frame that was so convincing that it justified high deaths, 
confidence and approval in the government would be high, the government would be able to use 
the measures it wants with little popular opposition. This is not necessarily a desirable outcome, if 
the government’s aims or advice are more than questionable. Still, it is a useful measure as it lets 
us understand the strength of the connection between the government and the population, and 
estimate the relevance of framing in creating and maintaining that relationship. A strong 
correlation between confidence and approval of the government would imply that a government’s 
frame had an effect on people. No correlation would signal that framing is not relevant in 
understanding how people viewed the pandemic and responded to it.  
 
As an example, below is the graph provided by YouGov for confidence in health 
authorities. For all countries there is a generally flat trend, so I ignored the first one or two data 
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points when they were much lower than the medium-term trend. This was true for all YouGov 
polls I use for my analysis. The aim was really to understand how most people were generally 
feeling over this 2-3 month period. This meant I could not analyse some of the other measures 
YouGov polled, as many poll questions had data that fluctuated too much and that did not allow 

























































































































































































































Fig 5: Confidence in Government
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The three graphs show no correlation between framing and either compliance, confidence 
in the government, or positive views of government handling. This suggests that government 
framing had little impact on how people perceived the pandemic and their role in it, and thus that 
the government was not effective at using a particular frame to instil desired behaviours or 
thoughts.  
As I was doing the research to fill in the index for each country, it became more obvious 
why it seems there is no link between government framing and the way people perceive the crisis. 
Other than researchers like myself, few people will read through ever speech made by the head of 
state and be confronted to the same amount of information I found. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
importantly, people rely on the media and on relatives to get most of their information, rather than 
on government speeches. The way the media talks about the virus will likely be more 
sensationalised than the government does, and will likely not reflect the government’s stance. It 
would be interesting to see if this is also the case in countries were the state controls the media 
narrative, such as in China. The framing index is not a very useful too in understanding how 
government framing affected people’s understanding of the coronavirus pandemic. 
 
Where there is value in my index is in understanding how governments viewed their own 
role in the pandemic. What head of state speeches reflect more accurately is the mindset of that 
head of state, and thus the mindset with which they will approach the pandemic and the sort of 
responses and policies they will enact. This is likely why the correlation between the Covid 
Performance Index and the framing index is so visible. Governments that viewed the pandemic as 
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a security issue, who believed too much in their country’s ability to handle the crisis through 
regular pre-established protocols and resources stockpiles, are the countries that failed to 
understand the different nature of the virus.  
The connection between a government’s speech and its actions, between the frame it 
presents to the public and the frame it understands the crisis through, is not evident. It takes a 
thorough analysis of government documents to shed light on it, as governments frequently do not 
speak their true opinion or manipulate information to present their options and actions in a certain 
way. A frame remains a way to speak about an issue, and is not a policy itself that leads to direct 
impacts. The direct link between the frame and health outcomes is thus likely non-existent, as a 
frame does not guarantee that a government will enact this or that policy. Instead, it is looking at 
policies that help us understand the frame used, by getting a glimpse as to how the government 
understood the pandemic. The way a government and the politicians that constitute this 
government understand the crisis can most definitely lead to a particular frame being used. 
Simultaneously, the way they understand the crisis leads to certain policies being used. Assuming 
that framing directly leads to policies ignores the way politicians in the government understand 







3.4 – Why did countries choose the frame they did? 
 
This question may be hard to answer precisely because one cannot peer inside a head of 
state’s thoughts. However, analysing enough speeches and combining that with an understanding 
of a country’s social, historic, political and legal context can help us answer this. Understanding 
why a frame was chosen helps us gage the effects the frame had, as it lets us understand how the 
government viewed its role in the pandemic, and thus the sort of actions it took to deal with it. 
 
Canada – the prevalent theme in Trudeau’s speeches was a reference to the sacrifices made 
in WWI by the Canadians who had gone to fight in the trenches. There was one particularly moving 
moment during a commemoration speech when he talked about those who had fought at Vimy 
Ridge in France, when “ordinary people did extraordinary things” to “defend the values that 
[Canadians] hold dear.” He then explained how these ordinary people doing can be found again 
today in the doctors and nurses of Canada, and more broadly in Canadians doing the right thing to 
help others and limit the spread of the virus.13 Canada is a relatively young nation with a young 
shared history. Canadian involvement in WWI, and especially at Vimy Ridge, are thus very 
important aspects of Canadian history and Canadian nation building, which echo and resonate with 
all Canadians. My verdict from having read dozens of speeches from Trudeau is that it was not his 
intention to frame the pandemic in a militaristic or security way, nor did he try to frame himself as 
a wartime leader. However, he made the connections to WWI because he knew it was an example 
of self-sacrifice and heroism that most Canadians would understand and connect with, and one 
 
13 Trudeau, ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Updating Canadians on the Modelling of the COVID-19 Situation’. 
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that would be emotional enough to compel Canadians to act upon coronavirus recommendations. 
Trudeau also stood out in being the only head of state who used such comparisons between the 
coronavirus and a past war. Trump and Macron talked more broadly about war, which allowed 
them to present themselves as wartime leaders. In a particular speech in which Trudeau talked 
about the frontline being everywhere, he moderated his comments by saying that “this is not a 
war.”14 Trudeau instead focussed on the historical and national unity relevance of war. Whilst 
Trudeau talked about WWI, he was acting in a way that showed he understood the pandemic as a 
socio-economic one and was taking the right steps toward that, by expanding social security nets 
and unreservedly supporting local governments.  
 
Japan – After losing WWII, Japan adopted a constitution that forbids it from having a 
military. Japan instead has a self-defence force (SDF), which is heavily regulated by the Diet in 
what it can and cannot do. For example, the SDF is expressly allowed to be used by the government 
for disaster relief operations. Since there is no law that says that the SDF is allowed to be used in 
the case of a health crisis, the government had to frame the SDF’s response as being disaster relief 
to fit within the legal requirements. Japan also has a very uneasy relationship with its militaristic 
past, and thus comparisons made between the pandemic and WWII would have been very highly 
criticised by many opposition politicians, by the Japanese people, and particularly by Japan’s 
neighbours like South Korea and China.  
The Japanese government had a rather hands-off-approach to the pandemic, without 
lockdowns or mask mandates. It asked people to do the right thing, rather than force them. One 
 
14 Trudeau, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech to the House of Commons on Canada’s Response to the COVID-19 
Pandemic’. 
 43 
source I found suggests that this is actually similar to what Japan did during WWII. They explain 
that in both cases, the government relies on the Japanese people’s strong sense of duty and 
obedience towards the government, and the government can thus get people to do what it wants 
without forcing them to, but just by telling them that doing so make them a good Japanese citizen. 
The article concludes that the danger, which can be found both during WWII and with the 
coronavirus pandemic, is that it puts the burden on the Japanese people and allows the government 
to relieve itself of responsibilities and blame. Though the scope of my research limits my ability 
to comment on this argument, I would generally agree with it based on my observations of Japan’s 
coronavirus response. What it points out is that even though the government of Japan did not 
publicly present the pandemic as a security issue, it may have in some sense internally viewed it 
as one. It would also suggest that the Japanese government viewed the pandemic as a sort of ‘messy 
affair it would rather keep its hands out of,’ which is one way modern military conflicts could be 
described by politicians.15  
 
France – Macron’s speech was very militaristic, with him making numerous comparisons 
between war and the pandemic, even repeating 6 times in one speech that France was at war against 
the virus. With Trudeau we saw that despite the security frame, his actions showed he understood 
the crisis in socio-economic terms. With Macron however, his use of a security frame did not 
immediately come with socio-economic actions. Of all countries studied, Macron was the one who 
had the most militaristic speech, even more so than Trump. My explanation would be that Macron 
saw the coronavirus pandemic as a way to frame himself as a strong leader in times of crisis, and 
 
15 Ota, ‘Wartime Japan and COVID-19 Conformity Offer Some Parallels’. 
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do so by emphasising his role as commander-in-chief. Macron’s presidential style is one that 
emphasises the role of president as a powerful leader, and is often described as being “Jupiterian”. 
However, Macron did not have the opportunity to exercise his powers during a time of true crisis. 
His predecessor, Francois Hollande, had launched the war in Mali, had launched the war in Syria, 
and had led France through the terrorist attack wave of 2015. These were extremely salient security 
issues in France that gave Hollande credibility and visibility as a wartime leader, perhaps against 
Hollande’s own intentions. Meanwhile, Macron’s political endeavours had mostly presented him 
as a socio-economic president, focussing on administrative reforms, pension reforms and a petrol 
tax. Before the coronavirus pandemic, his popularity had suffered from his struggles with the gilets 
jaunes, in which he had used the state security apparatus against the French people, rather than in 
support of it. The pandemic thus presented Macron the perfect opportunity to turn things around 
and show himself as the leader and saviour France needed. Medals were given to healthcare 
workers, many foreign ‘frontline’ workers were awarded French citizenship as a parallel to the 
concept of “French by the (spilt) blood” which grants citizenship to Foreign Legion soldiers 
wounded when fighting for France, and healthcare workers were honoured during the military 
parade on Bastille Day. These are all symbolic events that cement Macron’s role as commander-
in-chief even though the crisis is sanitary rather than military. All of this led to Macron blurring 
the lines between his roleplaying and his responsibilities as head of state, and he came to 
understand the pandemic in similar terms to those who put their full trust in the Global Health 
Security Index. What it means is that Macron became overly confident that France’s advanced 
health safety measures would be sufficient to stop the pandemic, and thus he was caught off guard 
when his measures failed to yield results. France was even one of the only countries that had an 
official policy of publicly discouraging people from wearing masks, going as far as banning mask 
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sales in pharmacies, so as to keep stocks filled for healthcare workers. This is a perfect example 
of the government’s mindset of ‘we do not need the people to do anything because the 
government’s body of experts will do it, and they need all of the resources for it.’ This policy, and 
France’s general early approach to the virus, created embarrassment for the government which 
reduced its credibility, confusion for the people which reduced their willingness to cooperate when 
the government did implement more sound policies, and a sense of general mistrust towards the 
government. This can be seen in the ‘view of government handling’ and ‘confidence in 
government’ YouGov polls having low scores for France amongst the countries studied.  
There are two similarities to be made between Macron and Trump, both of whom used 
strong security frames. They are political outsiders, newcomers in political, without a track record 
of successes or political leadership to rely on. They are also the heads of state and government in 
a presidential system. It is possible that both Macron and Trump used a security frame as a way to 
boost their popularity and reaffirm their position as a ‘real’ politician that fully deserves their place 
at the top of the political hierarchy. In presidential systems, particularly in France and the US, 
there is an expectation to have a strong, present head of state. This would have created the right 
conditions for a political newcomer to use a security frame to reaffirm their position as president.  
France is also competing for its place as a global power. The US knows it is a global 
superpower and that everyone sees it as such, so it does not feel the urge to point it out every time. 
France however is not in that position, and will take every opportunity to remind itself and remind 
the world of its power. Operation Resilience, the French military operation launched to ‘combat’ 
the virus, saw the use of three amphibious helicopter carriers sent to the Mediterranean, to the 
Caribbean, and to the South Indian Ocean, the latter two to help with France’s overseas territories. 
There were also air force operations in the Pacific. It is a powerful and rare communication 
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opportunity for the French army to plot its coronavirus operations on a map not using a map of 
France, but using a world map. I am confident that Macron and his chief of staff were aware of 
this dimension of France’s militaristic coronavirus response.  
 
Sweden – The Swedish approach, similarly to the Japanese one, has been very hands-off. 
The Swedish government actually states that its policy in times of crises is to let each ministry deal 
with the issues in its portfolio, thus devolving and spreading out responsibility for crisis handling. 
As such, it was hard for the Swedish government to employ a security frame, because the non-
security ministries such as the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Finance were quick to act and 
take their responsibilities. The Ministry of Defence likely understood that it would have little to 
do in dealing with the pandemic, and instead stood by in case other ministries might need its help. 
The devolved response style also meant that the PM had a much smaller role. He made one speech 
about the pandemic on March 22, 2020, and then did not speak again about it. There was thus no 
centralisation of powers in the head of government, and no emphasis of his role as leader or 
commander-in-chief.16  
What I did find interesting with Sweden is that though it did not frame or understand the 
virus as a security issue, its Ministry of Defence still understood the security risks that a pandemic 
can lead to. The Ministry of Defence often talked about the steps it was taken to limit cases 
amongst its ranks, to maintain readiness and trainings to balance Russia in the region. The Minister 
of Defence went as far as decrying that the Russian army was dealing with the pandemic much 
better than the Swedish army was, and that this was creating an imbalance in favour of Russia. 
 
16 Jonung, ‘Sweden’s Constitution Decides Its Exceptional Covid-19 Policy’. 
 47 
The concept of keeping coronavirus cases low amongst troops to maintain readiness and allow the 
army to maintain its role as protector of the nation is one I found in all cases. In other countries it 
felt more like something a government agency might say because it has to. In Sweden it felt most 
genuine and most specific.  
 
USA – There are many similarities between the case of the US and that of France. Thinking 
about Trump’s presidential style and history of statements and actions, it was little surprising that 
he would use the pandemic to frame himself as a wartime president and emphasise his role as 
commander-in-chief. I would say that the personality of Trump is the main factor for the US 
adopting a strong security frame. This is supported by reading press reports in which both Trump 
and other government officials speak, such as Vice President Pence or Secretary of Health Azar, 
and noticing the strong differences in speech, tone and language between Trump and the other 
speakers. 
The US has the second highest per capita military spending in the world,17 more guns than 
inhabitants,18 and veterans make up 7% of the adult population.19 The military is highly respected, 
and is very present and visible whether it be in public monuments or during large sporting events. 
Virtually everyone in the US knows someone who is or who has served. The US is thus a very 
militaristic society. Similarly to Canada, the US has a relatively young history in which tales of 
military heroism have a very strong place in the nation building exercise. This makes comparisons 
to war a very compelling option for a president who wants to make the ordeal relatable to the 
 
17 Roser and Nagdy, ‘Military Spending’. 
18 Horsley, ‘Guns in America, By the Numbers’. 
19 ‘Census Bureau Releases New Report on Veterans’. 
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general population, and who wants to benefit from the uniting powers of such appeals to war. The 
US also has a vast and diverse military apparatus which the president has relative discretionary 
powers over, giving the president the chance to flex his military muscle with ease. Furthermore, 
the military is one of the few agencies the federal government has control of with a large 
manpower, and so even if a president had wanted to refrain from adopting a security frame, it 
would likely have had no choice but to send in the army to provide the necessary manpower to 
help local governments.  
 
 
Below is a summary of this section.  
Country Framing index 
score 
Reason for use or non-use of security frame elements 
Canada 2.5 Use of security frame as an appeal to shared history to make 
the coronavirus relatable, and to inspire Canadians to adopt 
sanitary measures, coupled with a government understanding 
that a response should not be a security response. 
Japan 1.5 WWII historical and legal legacies make it hard or impossible 
for Japan to do or say anything military.  
France 6.5 Macron’s deliberate use of the crisis to present himself as a 
wartime president, and to project the power of the French state 
to both the world and the French people 
Sweden 1 A hands-off government approach that makes each ministry 
responsible for its own affairs during the crisis, which 
decentralises powers and allows socio-economic ministries to 
establish their responsibilities  
USA 8 Trump’s deliberate use of the crisis to present himself as a 
wartime president, and the general militarism of American 
society that tends to frame every issue through a security lens. 
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3.5 – Further General Discussion 
 
Thinking about the use of a security rhetoric is most useful when understood in context 
with what else is being said, to better understand why the issue may be framed through a security 
lens some of the time. Focussing on the use of specific words taken out of context does not let us 
grasp the broader message the government tries to pass on, nor does it let us understand what sort 
of actions the government is actually taking. A frame could be a genuine reflection of the 
government’s understanding of the pandemic, or it could be a strategic tool used to manipulate 
public opinion. By putting it into context, by looking at other speeches, at how a specific phrase 
fits within a broader speech, by thinking about the correspondence or dissonance between words 
and actions, it becomes easier to see whether the government really believes the frame they use is 
the appropriate one, or whether they are using that particular frame to influence the way people 
view and act upon the crisis.  
 
The coronavirus pandemic was a novel threat not just for many governments, but also for 
the general population. Making the crisis relatable to people was a major early struggle for 
governments, to instil in people the necessary sense of urgency needed to approach the crisis with 
a ‘whole of country’ approach from the get-go. A health crisis is not one that Western governments 
and populations have recently faced, so there was no common experience or history related to 
pandemics that governments and people could talk about. There was however a strong history of 
military and security hardships, whether it be WWI in Canada or terrorism in France. There is 
nothing inherently wrong with employing a security frame to talk about a health issue or a socio-
economic issue. If militarism is prevalent in the society or if a large part of a country’s nation 
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building is done through tales of military heroism, then using a security frame can be positive. It 
makes the socio-economic event relatable by presenting it in familiar terms to the general public, 
and it allows for a government to make appeals for unity, sacrifice and duty toward the nation and 
others, which are all positive social traits to foster when tackling a pandemic. This is what Trudeau 
did in Canada, and is an example of where a security frame has been used positively. Looking at 
the broader context makes it clear that he understood the issue as a socio-economic one and acted 
upon it accordingly, but that on occasions he framed it as a security one because he felt that would 
touch the Canadian’s hearts and minds most effectively. Trudeau talked about values and 
behaviours necessary in war, such as duty, selflessness and reaching out to neighbours, to imply 
that they were also necessary for the pandemic. Many Eastern countries however had faced health 
crises in recent times, particular SARS in the early 2000s. They had developed not just a pandemic 
playbook, but also a pandemic wordbook to incorporate the right lexicon, values and behaviours 
inside their societies. They did not need to use false parallels between war and pandemics, because 
they already knew how to talk about health crises.20  
 
A positive aspect of the security frame is that it emboldened many countries to pass titanic 
economic and social reforms which would not have passed during regular times. The socio-
economic changes that occurred during WWII were significant contributors to improving women’s 
rights and social protections for vulnerable populations. In Canada for example, it became easier 
for the government and public to talk about and agree on topics like universal basic income, 
mortgage reduction or eviction suspensions.21 In Sweden, the PM presented the pandemic as an 
 
20 Thompson, ‘What’s Behind South Korea’s COVID-19 Exceptionalism?’ 
21 Gerster, ‘Trudeau Says “the Front Line Is Everywhere,” but Should We Compare Coronavirus to War?’ 
 51 
“opportunity to simultaneously create jobs and address societal challenges.”22 If the many social 
protections and societal changes enacted throughout the world in response to the pandemic can 
last, this period could be a transformational one similar to WWII. It is too early to say for sure, but 
revisiting this point in a decade would lead to interesting discussions.  
 
Responding to a crisis appropriately requires understanding what causes that crisis and who 
is best equipped to deal with it. Military history gives us many examples of that. Military and 
political leaders often overestimate their state’s strength and power projection, and assume that 
this is enough to crush the crisis. We can use the silly example of the Australian ‘Emu War’ when 
leaders thought that the best way to deal with an emu infestation in the 1930s was by applying 
WWI tactics and use heavy machineguns against the birds. Naturally, the successes were very 
limited, and it was not until a bio-conservation mindset was applied that the problem was 
controlled. A more saddening example is the US’ never-ending wars in the Middle East. American 
leaders thought that a heavy intervention by the world’s most advanced and powerful army would 
leave the enemy no chance. However, when it came to dealing with occupied populations and 
rebuilding a country’s political, economic and social life, the US army found itself helpless 
because it had failed to consider the human and long-term implications of its invasion. The Emu 
War, the War on Terror, and similarly the US or France’s war on the coronavirus, were all near-
guaranteed to fail from the start, because the leaders misunderstood the problem and thus applied 
the wrong solution. Looking at framing as I do in this paper allows us to grasp how leaders 
understand problems, by seeing how they talk about it across numerous speeches and statements.  
 
22 Löfven, ‘Statement of Government Policy, 08 September 2020’. 
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There were a lot of discussions when the coronavirus first started spreading around the 
world, with experts and heads of state, Donald Trump including, referring to the Global Health 
Security Index. The GHS is an index built by John Hopkins University, with the data assembled 
in part by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and works similarly in terms of methodology the 
Democracy Index. The GHS views health crises in a narrow scope, putting a heavy weight on the 
presence of high-tech biolabs, of dedicated biohazard response teams, or of detailed government 
response plans. The GHS itself understands pandemics through a security frame, viewing health 
crises as narrow and small events that are solved through a targeted, resource intensive and expert 
government response. This would have been a great predictor of success to a pandemic if the health 
crisis had been similar to Ebola or MERS, with a hard hitting, very obvious and debilitating virus, 
or with a bio-terrorist attack. The problem for many Western nations like France and the US is that 
their previous pandemic response had been dealing with Ebola or other scary diseases that in the 
end had had very little effect in the West due to good monitoring and response mechanisms. This 
emboldened these nations and showed them that a security response to a health crisis is an efficient 
one. Though government officials may not have directly relied on their experiences with Ebola to 
act against the coronavirus, the early attitude to the coronavirus was thus in many ways similar to 
that of with Ebola, with an assumption that only less wealthy countries without the same access to 
monitoring or expert healthcare systems would be heavily impacted. Both Macron and Trump 
expressed their lack of worries thanks to having the “best doctors” and the “best monitoring 
system” at their disposal. For a disease with heavy symptoms, that would have been the case. For 
a disease like the coronavirus, which often leads to patients being asymptomatic, governments 
could not ‘attack’ the virus or ‘attack’ the patients by quarantining symptomatic patients. 
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Governments that were successful understood from the outset that it would require a whole-of-
country approach that puts individuals in the centre as actors against the virus.  
 
Coupled with this came the belief by many that the coronavirus pandemic would be narrow 
in its time frame, that it was a time-specific event that would come, be dealt with, and leave. This 
can be seen in Trump’s emphasis of cases going down from a dozen to a handful in the first days, 
as if getting back down to zero cases would be the end of it. Macron also emphasised his belief 
that it would all blow over after some weeks. The assumption by those leaders was that the 
pandemic could be ‘defeated’ with a strong narrow government response in the first weeks, 
similarly to how the US or France had kept Ebola out just a few years prior. The security frame 
also came with the belief that the pandemic could actually be ‘won’, and determined success in 
terms of a binary winning or losing. This emphasised the focus on the short term and on the 
assumption that the government’s response and resources would be sufficient. 
 
For both Macron and Trump, the use of a security frame helped justify their actions and 
their use of the military. When Macron repeated that France was at war against the virus, it 
normalised the militaristic response that followed. People were less likely to question the presence 
of the army in the country’s coronavirus response, because the president had implied its seeming 
necessity by stating that the country was at war. It made the use of the military seem proportional, 
and thus few people questioned the potential overreach of the state and the military.  
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An aspect of the security frame not included in the index but that I nevertheless frequently came 
across and thought about was the hero-ification of healthcare workers and the comparison made 
between them and frontline soldiers. It was frequently mentioned in government speeches, it was 
epitomised by Macron awarding medals to healthcare workers, but perhaps more importantly, it 
was repeated by the media, by local governments, by businesses, and by practically all actors of 
society. We may not remember our head of government describing the virus as an invisible enemy, 
but we surely all remember clapping or banging pots at 7pm to celebrate the ‘heroes’ keeping us 
safe. Recognising the hardships faced by healthcare workers and the selflessness they exhibited 
was surely warranted, and governments pushed for that narrative as it was a crucial element of 
building national unity and framing the crisis in relatable term. The problem however was in the 
way the sacrifice of healthcare workers was presented as somewhat unavoidable, and thus worthy 
of hero-ification. If I place my glass bottles in the glass recycling receptable at the street corner, 
no one considers this special. However, if I travel 10 miles to go recycle my glass because that is 
where the nearest centre is, I will get praised for my dedication and be made an example of a good 
citizen. However, no one questions why I have to go through this much just to do a normal action. 
The same happened with healthcare workers. Emphasising their status of heroes distracted from 
the questions that should have popped up to ask why their sacrifice was needed in the first place. 
Healthcare workers come at the end of the chain, when governments failed to keep the virus at 
bay, and when individuals failed to engage in risk-reducing behaviour. In a sense, healthcare 
workers clean up the mess left by the government by taking care of those who have fallen ill. A 
proper response to a pandemic should not emphasise healthcare workers to treat ill patients, but 
should instead ensure patients do not get ill in the first place. This was the winning strategy in 
Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam or New Zealand. The hero-ification of workers displaces the 
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burden of responsibility away from the government and onto ordinary citizens who are now 
expected to do extraordinary feats to handle the pandemic, and normalises government inaction by 
implying that healthcare workers  
If you were to metaphorically ask the US government why it has troops in the Middle East, 
it would tell you not to think about it and instead to focus on the heroism of the troops there fighting 
for your freedom. Similarly if you were to ask the US government why healthcare workers were 
using trash bags as medical gowns, why they lacked ventilators, why hospitals are understaffed, 
or why they had to face an uncontrollable influx of COVID-19 patients, the government would tell 





4. US Case Study 
 
 I use an extensive case study of the US to explore in depth how the government there 
framed the coronavirus. This helps understand more specifically the impacts the frame had on 
popular compliance, the reasons for the government picking a specific frame, the effectiveness of 
the frame in shaping people’s perceptions of the pandemic, and the intermediary steps that connect 
government frame to popular actions or inactions. It also helps understand what a security frame 
means in real life by putting it into context for the reader with a real-life example most people will 
be familiar with. The US is also a clear outlier in how heavy its framing was securitised.  
 
4.1 – Trump’s preoccupation with remaining in command and in control 
 
The first part of the US government’s security framing was President Trump’s insistence that 
everything was under control, that there was nothing to worry about, and that the threat was 
minimal. It also involved deflecting blame onto foreign entities, such as China, the European 
Union, and the World Health Organisation.  
One may have expected Trump to declare a state of emergency and over-emphasise the danger 
of the treat from the very beginning, so as to increase his powers and position himself as the 
necessary solution to the crisis. However, this would not have fit with the traditional expectation 
to have a president and Commander-in-Chief that remains unfazed in the face of any threat. 
Panicking from the get-go would have shown weakness and a form of admitting defeat before the 
battle ever really began. Downplaying the threat by comparison allowed him to present the 
required solution as a narrow government response, one that did not need to ask people and 
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communities to get involved. Downplaying the threat also fits with the traditional need for a 
Commander-in-Chief to maintain the appearance that the government is run like a tight ship, and 
that the professionalism and strict hierarchy found in the military is also present in the government. 
As such, the professionalism and hierarchy ensure that there is no need to worry, and that no threat 
is too big for the government to handle. If a conflict erupted tomorrow between the US and China, 
an American president panicking would signal a lack of confidence in the country and army’s 
ability to deal with the threat. Keeping cool however signals strong belief in the country’s power 
and resource capabilities.  
In a security crisis, the head of state traditionally takes on the role of leader of the unified 
government response, reassures his citizens that the threat will not reach them thanks to the 
government’s response, and leaves little room for his subordinates to publicly dissent. The dual 
role of the head of state, as leader of both the political world and of the military world, is particular 
to the security apparatus. It is expected from government leaders to be in charge of security 
questions, the same as it is generally expected for many socio-economic issues to be delegated to 
specialist ministers.   
Trump’s first years in office had already shown how he cared about appearing to have 
“tremendous control” over a situation,23 and had demonstrated his appreciation for public displays 
that reinforced his position as Commander-in-Chief and leader of the security apparatus. When it 
came to the pandemic, Trump did delegate a lot of actual responsibilities to states. However, he 
still did not admit failure or loss of control, and the image he tried to transmit was one of a leader 
on top of the crisis. He also made it a point to show that he knew what he was doing with regard 
to the pandemic response, and that health experts like Dr. Fauci remained his subordinates, with 
 
23 Qiu, Marsh, and Huang, ‘The President vs. the Experts’. 
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Trump creating the appearance that he was alone in leading the federal response. In fact, the 
decentralisation to the states helps us see how Trump likely struggled with understanding the 
pandemic. His words were about staying in control, but his actions and policies made it so that 
actual decision-making became someone else’s problem. As we have seen before, security framing 
generally stems from a misunderstanding of the nature of the pandemic.  
 
 
Staying in Control 
 
A major impact this had was him lying to the public about the state of COVID, to minimize 
the danger and minimize the extent of the government’s struggles. Naturally, this did little to instil 
in people the feeling that the situation was an emergency that warranted strong individual actions 
like mask wearing or self-isolating.  
What is particular in Trump’s case was his use of misinformation before COVID had even 
reached the US, before it had become a threat, and before it had infected any American citizens. It 
made some sense to lie about the extent of the pandemic when it had become uncontrollable, as 
this allowed him to hide the government’s malfunctions. Lying and minimizing the threat from the 
beginning is more peculiar, and is one of the main differences between countries that successfully 
handled the first wave of COVID, and those who did not. Whilst Trump was downplaying the 
virus in the US, Angela Merkel in Germany was preparing the public to the idea that “60 to 70 
percent of the [German] population will be infected.” Whereas Trump was not acknowledging the 
virus, Merkel was presenting Germany with the worst-case scenario.24 
 
24 Bennhold and Eddy, ‘Merkel Gives Germans a Hard Truth About the Coronavirus’. 
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Trump’s stance in January and February thus helps understand how he wanted to frame the 
pandemic from the start. Rather than warn about the threat of the coronavirus, which he and the 
administration knew would be coming, Trump spent the first months downplaying it, claiming 
how it was just “one person coming in from China” and that everything was “totally under 
control.”25 This dialogue purposefully ignored the socio-economic and medical aspects of the 
virus. Instead, the focus was on the foreignness of the virus, and on the federal government’s ability 
to handle it without having to implicate or worry the general public.  
 
A key part of Trump’s response was portraying himself as fully and personally in charge, 
not taking orders or needing advice from others. Trump is the Commander-in-Chief and as such is 
expected to know everything warfare and implementing a militaristic response. However, the role 
of president does not require public health knowledge. It was thus challenging for Trump, as leader 
of the country and the executive, to admit that he knew little about the pandemic or the science to 
tackle it. He often praised himself for “understanding it” and being able to take decisions on his 
own, without the help of medical experts. He credited “himself with instinctive understanding of 
the science.”26 On many occasions he mocked Alex Hazar, the Secretary of HHS, and Dr Anthony 
Fauci of the COVID taskforce.27, 28 This fits with the idealized image of the general, who gives 
orders and takes none, who is a natural born leader. Admitting the threat of the coronavirus would 
have required Trump to give increased powers to the CDC, the Department of HHS, and other 
 
25 Rogers, ‘Trump Now Claims He Always Knew the Coronavirus Would Be a Pandemic’. 
26 Baker, ‘For Trump, Coronavirus Proves to Be an Enemy He Can’t Tweet Away’. 
27 Rogers, ‘Trump Now Claims He Always Knew the Coronavirus Would Be a Pandemic’. 
28 Bennhold and Eddy, ‘Merkel Gives Germans a Hard Truth About the Coronavirus’. 
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public health agencies. Instead, he focussed the government’s response through military agencies 
like the Department of Defence or the Department of Veteran Affairs. 
His exaggerated self-portrayal created a gap between his advice and that of public health 
experts, and did not help build popular confidence towards public health experts. It also had the 
effect of making many people have to choose between following presidential advice, which is 
generally considered trustworthy, or following the advice of relatively unknown health experts. 
Unfortunately due to the strong partisanship present in the US at the time, many of Trump’s 
strongest supporters chose to trust him, and thus began to refuse following health guidelines.  
 
It was also important for Trump to maintain a “business-as-usual approach to the rest of 
his schedule,”29 and that he would not let the virus stop him from being the President he wants to 
be. He remained unconcerned of the threat of the pandemic reaching the White House,30 reflecting 
his view of the US and the government as unreachable and untouchable, with the means to keep 
the danger away. He often presented the pandemic was a hoax created by his political opponents 
as way to embarrass him. When Trump did fall ill with COVID-19, even then refused to let that 
stop him from carrying on working from the Oval Office whilst sick.31  
This created a false sense of normalcy that encouraged regular people to believe that their 
situation was also normal, and that they too should carry on as usual. It also reinforced the feeling 
of invincibility that many people experienced, which helped people self-justify their unsanitary 
behaviour as low-risk.  
 
 
29 Baker, ‘For Trump, Coronavirus Proves to Be an Enemy He Can’t Tweet Away’. 
30 Baker. 
31 Haberman and Thomas, ‘Trump Calls His Illness “a Blessing From God”’. 
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There were signs from the beginning that the US would approach the pandemic through a 
security lens. On a broader and historic level, the US has frequently used security crises for the 
purpose of nation building. Many of the US’ greatest shared hardships relate to recent wars or 
terrorist attacks, with security from foreign threats being a generally unifying theme in American 
politics.  
Thinking about the Vietnam War, an issue that did require a strong security frame and a 
security-minded response, part of the US’ failure was its inability to also consider the necessity for 
a socio-economic frame, both in Vietnam and in the US. The US government did not think about 
the need to communicate about the war with its own population. This led to high domestic 
opposition, making it hard for the government to effectively implement its military decisions. For 
the first significant time in the US’ military history, the flow of information from the centre of the 
crisis to the mainstream public was no longer fully controlled by the government. Independent 
journalists and leaked government files allowed the public to get information that went against the 
government’s narrative. The government had expected to get away with lying, and when it could 
not, it created a mistrust and a disconnect between the government and the public. It created 
resentment against the government’s actions, and increased non-compliance such as draft dodging.  
In 2020, the government knew it could not control the media narrative and the information 
that the general public had of the virus. Yet, it tried to and insisted that its narrative was the factual 
one. Claims were often “overstated or inaccurate,”32 or information was simply withheld and 
hidden from the public. This is similar to war time information strategies that emphasize victories 
and gloss over difficulties and loses by controlling information. However, the US government did 
not realize that with war against the coronavirus being on the home front, both the mainstream 
 
32 Baker, ‘For Trump, Coronavirus Proves to Be an Enemy He Can’t Tweet Away’. 
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media and the general public could report on what they were seeing and experiencing. The 
government’s failure in having its frame be the dominant one is reminiscent of its communication 
failure during the Vietnam War. Trump’s government did not hesitate lying to create a narrative 
suitable to its needs, whilst forgetting about the ability of civil society to present the truth. It 
emphasized only a security frame, and ignored that people would realize that a socio-economic 





Another crucial aspect of President Trump’s particular response that indicated a strong 
desire to use a security frame, was his deflection of blame onto foreign entities, and his urge to 
close off the country from foreign threats. This may be seen as simple xenophobia, of which there 
surely was some. However, anti-immigration and xenophobic language is often rooted in security 
issues. Immigrants coming in are presented as rapists and criminals, as terrorists from ISIS or drug 
cartels members. The link between xenophobia and security framing cannot be ignored, and it lets 
us explore less obvious elements of a security frame that do not directly relate to militarism.   
Though experience with the coronavirus has shown that travel restrictions can be an 
extremely effective tool in limiting the virus’ spread, as Taiwan, New Zealand and Vietnam 
exemplify, this was not the pre-pandemic consensus. “Experts have long recommended against 
restricting travel during outbreaks, arguing that it is often ineffective and can stymie the response 
by limiting the movements of doctors and other health professionals trying to contain the 
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disease.”33 WHO guidelines pre-pandemic reflected this and recommended against travel 
restrictions, arguing that “they would hamper global travel and trade” and do little to stop the 
global spread of a pandemic.34 US experts added that worried “a ban would anger China, […] 
ending any hope of cooperation with American medical teams.”35 This is the stance most EU 
countries had in the early stages of the pandemic.  
 Thus, it can be argued that travel restrictions imposed in January, February, and March, 
were not motivated wholly by scientific evidence. The US’ actions and Trump’s rhetoric help 
demonstrate this. In January, Trump described the pandemic as “one person coming in from 
China.”36 His response was thus to target Chinese travellers, and on February 2, 2020, Trump 
claimed that the travel ban on China had stopped the spread of the virus, adding that they “pretty 
much shut it down coming in from China.”37 At this stage, there was no talk about how the US 
would domestically respond to the virus if it did begin spreading domestically. It could have been 
a time to begin focusing on the socio-economic solutions to the pandemic, by educating the public 
on staying safe and beginning to build stockpiles of medical resources. Instead, the emphasis 
remained on the foreignness of the threat, and the ability to keep the threat away by keeping 
foreigners away and closing borders. As the situation slowly worsened in the US, Trump went as 
far as suggesting in early March that the border wall with Mexico was needed “more than ever” to 
protect the US.38 
When Trump issued travel restrictions against the EU in mid-March, he talked of a “foreign 
virus” and blamed the EU for not restricting travel from China, like the US had done. He also 
 
33 Haberman and Weiland, ‘Inside the Coronavirus Response’. 
34 Mateus et al., ‘Effectiveness of Travel Restrictions in the Rapid Containment of Human Influenza’. 
35 Haberman and Weiland, ‘Inside the Coronavirus Response’. 
36 Qiu, ‘Analyzing the Patterns in Trump’s Falsehoods About Coronavirus’. 
37 Qiu, Marsh, and Huang, ‘The President vs. the Experts’. 
38 Qiu, Marsh, and Huang. 
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blamed the rise in cases in the US on travellers coming from the EU, 39 despite increasing 
community spread within the US and no proof to support his hypothesis. Trump’s attitude at the 
time was still that the virus could be stopped by blocking it at the border, the same way foreign 
terrorists may be stopped from entering the US. Putting responsibility on foreign entities allowed 
Trump to justify a lack of domestic response. Why place domestic restrictions or ramp up domestic 
testing, when closing borders allows to stop the virus from entering the US? When criticized for 
his lack of response, Trump replied that the government had a “perfectly coordinated and fine 
tuned plan” that relied on closing borders with China, Iran, and South Korea.40  
The security approach of closing borders could have worked if coupled with a socio-
economic approach. Other countries that restricted incoming travel also took the steps to address 
domestic spread and to monitor arrivals for contaminated patients, which meant that any case that 
managed to get into the country was effectively stimmed. The US took no such actions, focusing 
only on a security frame, which allowed the situation to worsen domestically whilst the 
government pretended the threat remained far abroad.  
 
A lot can also be inferred from the list of territories that faced travel restrictions to the US. 
For all 2020 the only places targeted were China, Iran, and the EU.41 Whilst there was a scientific 
rationale for choosing these three territories at the beginning of the pandemic, as all three were the 
hardest hit in early 2020, it is also strange that no other territories were added in 2020 despite a 
globally worsening situation, and that China, Iran and the EU were not dropped from the list as 
their situations improved. It is well known that Trump has strong feeling of animosity towards 
 
39 Onishi, ‘Chaos in Europe, and Anger, Over U.S. Travel Ban to Curb Coronavirus’. 
40 Baker, ‘For Trump, Coronavirus Proves to Be an Enemy He Can’t Tweet Away’. 
41 CDC, ‘COVID-19 and Your Health’. 
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China and Iran, and he views both of these countries as significant security threats for the US, 
particularly Iran in terms of terrorism and the US’ Middle East strategy, and China as a threat to 
the US’ Asia strategy. Trump frequently criticized the EU, particularly for not paying its fair share 
of the NATO budget. It is thus hard to believe that the US issued and maintained travel restrictions 
purely for health reasons.  
Though these travel restrictions were intended to protect the US public’s health, the 
security considerations added onto them by the US government reduced their efficacy and turned 
them into a diplomatic and political tool more than a domestic health tool. Dr. Osterholm, an 
epidemiologist and director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the 
University of Minnesota, pointed to the fact that by the time travel restrictions were placed on 
China, the virus was already in the US, and that “at this point, sharply curtailing air travel to and 
from China is more of an emotional or political reaction.” 42 
  
 
42 Corkery and Karni, ‘Trump Administration Restricts Entry Into U.S. From China’. 
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4.2 – Focusing on the physical/material aspect of the response 
 
The US is quite special in that it does not quite have a federal civilian body it can rely on 
intervene in large scale emergencies. Unlike in many other countries, there is no national health or 
firefighter service that the US can make use of. As a result, it is common to see the military 
intervene when FEMA needs manpower to help with floods, fires, or hurricanes. Thus, the US 
population is used to seeing the military handle large non-military issues in the name of the federal 
government. It perhaps also contributed to making the use of a security frame in the US inevitable, 
as there was no significant socio-economic tools or agencies the government could call up.  Given 
the successes and professionalism of the military when it intervenes for natural emergencies, the 
US public is also used to effective responses from the military. If the military is called in, it means 
that the issue has gotten significant, but it also means that the issue will be soon solved.  
The announcement in the early stages of the pandemic that the military would be intervening 
thus sent a strong message to the public, one of worry mixed with hope. It came with the 
expectation that the military’s intervention would be impactful and meaningful. When it became 
apparent that the intervention was a failure, it created a significant morale hit in the early stages of 
the pandemic, when high spirits were most needed. This did little to help fill the leadership vacuum 
that existed at the federal level.43 Finally, the over-reliance and under-delivery of the military 
helped spread doubt and confusion, as it made it harder for average people to conceptualize what 
sort of threat the pandemic posed if it was able to completely overpower the military, when the US 
military was generally perceived as an unbeatable force.  
 
 
43 Stolberg et al., ‘The Surging Coronavirus Finds a Federal Leadership Vacuum’. 
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Looking at how the US has organized its public health apparatus at the federal executive level 
sheds light on how much public health is framed through a security lens, even before the 
coronavirus became a concern.   
Prior to 2018, the executive branch’s dedicated pandemic team was under the umbrella of the 
National Security Council (NSC).44 The NSC is “the President’s principal forum for considering 
national security and foreign policy matters.”45 Before Trump shut it down, it was run by a military 
man Rear Adm. R. Timothy Ziemer, and were it still active now it would be in charge of leading 
the country’s pandemic response.46  
Similarly, within the Department of HHS, the Assistant Secretary for Health (ASH) is the 
person in charge of public health and of the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, a 
uniformed service of the federal government, as are the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The ASH is 
thus a soldier with the rank of four-star admiral.47 
Both these examples show how much the US government at its core views public health 
through a military lens, and helps understand why the military was expected to provide a solid 
response to the virus. 
 
 
Expectation for the military to provide a miracle solution 
 
From the very first days of the pandemic, the military took on an active role in the response. 
The passengers of the first repatriation flight in January 2020 from Wuhan to the US were sent to 
 
44 Haberman and Weiland, ‘Inside the Coronavirus Response’. 
45 ‘National Security Council’. 
46 Baker, ‘For Trump, Coronavirus Proves to Be an Enemy He Can’t Tweet Away’. 
47 Digital Communications Division, ‘HHS Organizational Chart’. 
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a mandatory quarantine on a military base. The justification was an unprecedented “heath threat”, 
with the government promising to take more “aggressive action to protect the public.” This was 
the first time since the 1960s that the federal government used its power to impose a quarantine.48  
 
In mid-March, local officials were beginning to wonder where the federal help was. The 
Army Corps of Engineers was ready to help build new hospitals and the Department of Veteran 
Affairs had spare capacity in their hospitals. For many local officials, federal help on the ground 
meant help from the army.49 The military had shown during the Ebola pandemic in 2014 that it 
could handle pandemics, as it had sent 3000 US to Liberia to help build hospitals, and the 
Department of Defense set up a command centre in Monrovia to coordinate the international 
response.50 
However, the military did not take a prominent role until April, by which time the pandemic 
was hitting some parts of the US with full swing. One of the interventions most covered by the 
media was the sending in the first week of April of the military hospital ship USNS Comfort to 
New York City, at the time the global epicentre of the virus, and its sister ship USNS Mercy to 
Los Angeles.51 It seemed that the move was an appropriate one, as the Comfort had “responded to 
the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, [and] came to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005. It 
[had] even been to New York before, when, in the days after the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks, the Comfort provided aid and medical help largely for emergency medical workers.”52 
 
48 Grady and Rabin, ‘195 Quarantined in California After Fleeing Coronavirus Epicenter’. 
49 Lipton, Kanno-Youngs, and Cooper, ‘Trump Slowly Enlisting More Agencies in “Whole of Government” 
Response to Virus’. 
50 Lipton, Kanno-Youngs, and Cooper. 
51 Schwirtz, ‘The 1,000-Bed Comfort Was Supposed to Aid New York. It Has 20 Patients.’ 
52 Cooper and Gibbons-Neff, ‘Navy Hospital Ship Reaches New York. But It’s Not Made to Contain Coronavirus.’ 
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President Trump “showed up to send off the Comfort in a show of national unity in a crisis,”53 and 
to maintain his image as in charge and in control. 
However, the move soon turned into a fiasco, as it became apparent that the ships had been 
sent more as a publicity stunt, than as part of a thought-out strategy. The ship sent to help with the 
pandemic was at first not allowed to take in COVID-19 patients, only took accepting non-COVID-
19 patients to alleviate the stress put by regular patients on New York hospitals. However, as the 
health situation worsened in New York, the Comfort eventually began taking COVID-19 patients 
too.54 However, within its first week, its 1200 staff and 1000 beds only had 20 patients, and the 
crew had already been infected with the virus despite all efforts against that.55   
Meanwhile, the Javits Convention Center, also in New York City, was turned into a field 
hospital and a sorting centre, also run by the military. A patient sent to the Center talked about the 
fear of getting tangled up in military bureaucracy, and the uncertainty of being treated by doctors 
that were not his family doctor or the local hospital he knew well. He acknowledged that “we are 
at war in a way.”56 The Department of Defense also sent army medics to integrate regular civilian 
public hospitals in the New York area and bolster their ranks.57 Additionally, it provided 5 million 
N95 masks to the state of New York, whilst the New York National Guard helped hand out 350,000 
meals.58 These were all actions that could have been performed by the traditional civilian social 
security apparatus. The government however both chose to use the military because of the 
military’s positive track record in non-security crisis handling, and was forced to choose the 
 
53 Cooper and Gibbons-Neff. 
54 Lopez, ‘Comfort, Javits Center Open Care to COVID-19 Patients’. 
55 Schwirtz, ‘The 1,000-Bed Comfort Was Supposed to Aid New York. It Has 20 Patients.’ 
56 Person, ‘I Was Sent to Be Treated for Covid-19 at the Javits Center. Here’s What It’s like.’ 
57 Lopez, ‘Comfort, Javits Center Open Care to COVID-19 Patients’. 
58 Lopez. 
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military because of a lack of alternative civilian agencies large enough to provide the necessary 
expertise, supplies, and manpower.  
 
 The military’s actions in New York were not repeated elsewhere, remained quite simplistic 
and peripheral to the heart of the problem of tackling the pandemic. They did not have the intended 
effect of instilling hope in the population, of showing effective military leadership in the pandemic 
response, or even of reducing coronavirus spread and fatalities in New York or in the US. As 
mentioned previously, many people viewed the military as near-invincible. Not only could the 
military not beat the virus, but the virus was beating the military. That it could be defeated by an 
invisible enemy made it harder to conceptualize what the disease was, making it easier for fake 
news, rumours, and lies to prosper.  
It also removed the military from the broader coronavirus response, as we have not seen 
the army take on an active role since April. This highlighted the disconnect between how the 
government wanted to frame the military’s role, versus how the military viewed its own role. The 
military categorically defined itself as providing an “emergency” response, outlining how the 










Trump’s preoccupation with a ‘miracle’ cure 
 
Another aspect of President Trump’s security framing was his over-reliance on a ‘miracle’ 
cure and his attempts at solving the pandemic solely through material supplies and resources. 
Trump’s pandemic approach fits that of the Pasteurian paradigm, which is the belief that a disease 
is caused by a specific virus, and as such that the solution to the disease is to target the virus, which 
can be done through vaccination or medication. The Pasteurian paradigm, and Trump’s talks of a 
miracle cure, fit right into a security frame, with a single threat addressed through a narrow, intense 
and expert-led response, where ‘throwing’ science, money, and resources at the problem can solve 
it. However, this approach to public health has been generally pushed aside, as experts increasingly 
recognize that diseases and disease spread are more complex than that, and that effectively 
reducing the spread of a disease also involves considering human behaviour, socio-economic 
conditions like education or wealth, and environmental factors.  
 
Trump frequently talked about finding a miracle cure for COVID-19, such as 
hydroxychloroquine.60 On February 27, 2020, Trump said of the coronavirus that “one day – it’s 
like a miracle – it will disappear.”61 He spent the rest of the year focusing the US’ response on 
finding that miracle. On March 2, 2020, Trump said that pharmaceutical companies would have 
vaccines “relatively soon.”62 Only nine months later did vaccines start to become available. When 
Trump was quizzed during a pre-election townhall about his government’s pandemic response, his 
reply pointed “to efforts by the administration to provide medical equipment like ventilators and 
 
60 Haberman and Thomas, ‘Trump Calls His Illness “a Blessing From God”’. 
61 Qiu, Marsh, and Huang, ‘The President vs. the Experts’. 
62 Qiu, Marsh, and Huang. 
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to develop treatments and a vaccine.”63 The ventilators had been produced in part thanks to the use 
of the Defense Production Act, a war-time act that Trump had talked a lot about, and which helped 
him reinforce the security frame of the pandemic. Ventilators, vaccines, and treatments are also 
measures that the government can do on its own or with business partners, which requires no effort 
or involvement from regular people. This fit with Trump’s broader narrative that the government 
would take care of the issue and that people need not worry.  
The conversation was often about the availability of supplies, and the testing capacity, 
emphasizing the logistical and material aspect of the response.64 However, masks and tests are not 
enough if there is not a robust public health education program behind to mobilize people to wear 
masks, go get tested, and avoid meeting up with others. There was talk of more ventilators, but no 
talk of more qualified healthcare workers needed to operate them.  The material-focused rhetoric 
let him ignore the broader socio-economic front that includes social distancing, economic relief, 
and an effective communication strategy. The more his message spread, the more people believed 
it and also embraced a Pasteurian perspective. This made it harder to convince people that waiting 






63 Baker, ‘Trump, in Philadelphia, Says He “Up-Played” the Virus, Then Downplays It’. 
64 Qiu, ‘Analyzing the Patterns in Trump’s Falsehoods About Coronavirus’. 
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Lack of socio-economic considerations, and reliance on Pasteurian paradigm 
 
As detailed above, Trump’s approach to the pandemic through a Pasteurian paradigm likely 
allowed him to put aside the broader socio-economic considerations of the pandemic. This is 
important when considering the more obvious and direct aspects of the pandemic response that 
can be considered social, such as convincing people to wear masks or to avoid going to work when 
sick. However, it is crucial to consider the role the government has in giving people the resources 
needed to wear masks or stay at home when sick. No matter how much you convince someone of 
the necessity to stay home, if they live pay check to pay check, need to go work to afford to survive, 
and cannot rely on social security as a safety net, then they will go work. This situation was 
responsible for the spread of the virus in many minority communities, where despite best intentions 
and a will to comply, people were often left with no choice, having to choose between putting 
themselves at risk of the virus or having no income to bring back home.  
 
The US’ lack of universal health coverage or social security nets was a clue as to the US’ 
strong usage of a security framing. There was little socio-economic apparatus that the government 
could talk about or make use to tackle the pandemic. Countries that from the start recognized that 
they would have to economically support people and adopt a wide socio-economic response were 
those that best handled the early stages of the pandemic. When in China the government closes 
down a city, it ensures that food is still delivered and that people keep receiving some income to 
keep paying bills. In the EU, bankruptcies for small businesses have gone down compared to last 
year despite long and intense lockdowns. In the US, lockdowns were met with strong opposition 
because small business owners knew they would receive no financial help. The security frame 
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completely failed to consider this, and the general popular consensus for a $2000 stimulus check 
shows how people soon realized that the government was failing to consider the socio-economic 
part of the pandemic.  The over-reliance on the military, and the over-securitization of the issue, 
lead to a disconnect between leaders and regular people, which was not conductive to creating the 
necessary sentiments of unity to get regular people on board. A limited intervention from the 
military, or directed narrow parallels to wars, could have been effective. However, there was too 
much security talk, and it was poorly focussed.  
 
There is a link between a reliance on militarization to seem ready to handle problems, and 
the ability to actually solve a problem when it arises. The US scored excellently on the Global 
Health Security Index for pandemic preparedness, in part due to its high wealth and high 
technology. This can result in leaders “having overconfidence in existing health systems, leading 
to collective complacency and politicisation of necessary public health responses during crises.”65 
This became apparent when it came to doing the real thing, with the obvious flaws in the system 
vividly appearing, chief of which was a lack of universal health care and a lack of a social approach 
to healthcare.66  
The same was the case for many of the US’ recent military interventions, from the Vietnam 
War to the War on Terror. Each time it thought it could handle the issue through force, playing a 
numbers game to demonstrate it had better and more resources than the enemy. However, when it 
came to considering the realities of implementation, human and social aspects were ignored, and 
the US was unable to win the war of hearts and minds. The same was also true for the US’ approach 
to the War on Drugs. The government thought that throwing resources would help stop drug 
 
65 Lal et al., ‘Fragmented Health Systems in COVID-19’. 
66 Lal et al. 
 75 
consumption in the US, by criminalizing and militarizing the response. It failed to consider the 
socio-economic reasons behind drug use, and as a result the War on Drugs was only effective in 
wasting taxpayer dollars and jailing countless petty criminals or drug victims that would have been 
better served by rehabilitation and re-education programs.  
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4.3 – Freedom and Individual Liberties 
 
The third part of the analysis of the US government’s framing of the pandemic through a 
security lens looks at the approach the government had on the question of freedom, liberty, and 
individual sacrifices. Wars usually lead to greater restrictions on freedoms at home, but wars are 
also fought to protect these same freedoms and rights. Many security issues are presented as issues 
of freedom: “we fight now, we may restrict some rights now, but we do it so that in the long term 
your rights remain protected from malicious forces.” Wars are fought to protect our freedom, or to 
give freedom to oppressed people abroad. One of the most famous constitutionally protected right 
in the US is the right to bear arms. In contrast, socio-economic issues are often linked to greater 
government oversight and intervention, particularly in the US where it is not uncommon to hear 
politicians compare universal health care to communism, the enemy of the free people of America. 
There is also a partisan element, with the Republican party in the US generally being a champion 
of both security and freedom issues, and tying those in together when possible. As with the topic 
of xenophobia previously explored, the discourse around rights and the pandemic does not directly 
relate to militarism. Still, thinking about the way freedoms and individual liberties were talked 
about helps us understand the broader context of the security frame, and the parallels between the 
use of a security frame for the coronavirus versus a security frame for a war. 
Responding to a pandemic effectively is very politically challenging for a government 
whose population is not used to it, as it requires asking people to limit their freedoms, and for 
people to make the greatest effort and sacrifice. In countries that effectively deal with the pandemic 
from the onset, the success was in great part due to individuals wearing masks and avoiding 
 77 
gatherings out of their own will, without the government needing to take strong measures to 
enforce these rules.  
 Furthermore, the ideal solution to a problem framed through a security lens should not 
require the common people to make efforts. The distinction between those in your population that 
have the tools to fight the threat, and those who do not, can quite easily be made in a security crisis. 
The War on Drugs and the War on Terror were conducted by elite forces within the military and 
federal security agents, not by average citizens. This allows for narrow responses, which as 
mentioned before require high financial and technological investments, but not large public efforts. 
In a pandemic, the distinction disappears, and everyone become a combatant against the virus. 
This requires increasing public awareness and educating people on their individual roles, which is 
more akin to a socio-economic frame.  
Though Trump knew that the virus was “deadly stuff,” he chose to downplay it as he did 
not “want to create a panic” and “scare everybody.”67 In his view, there was no need for popular 
efforts to tackle the virus, and rather the solution would come from the government. This is similar 
to how a government might react whilst losing a war, as the government would likely not ask 
regular people to take up weapons, but instead would reassure the population that all is well whilst 
the enemy slowly rolls in. It also reflects his lack of trust in the people’s ability to be part of the 
response against the virus, as if telling them the truth would only make everyone panic and become 
a hinderance. It shows how much he wanted to keep the public out of the issue and address it 
directly with a narrow government response rather than with a broad public one. Countries that 
were more successful in tackling the pandemic did the opposite, trusting and implicating from the 
start the general public, and ensuring that everyone was doing their part.  
 
67 Haberman, ‘Trump Admits Downplaying the Virus Knowing It Was “Deadly Stuff”’. 
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A specific example where people in the US were not asked to make an effort was with 
masks, with Trump and his supporters often framing mask wearing as a liberty issue. Trump views 
mask wearing as a “personal choice,” which has led to people following this mantra even in places 
where the law requires a mask.68 People who refuse to wear masks have often cited civil 
disobedience and the right to stand against restrictive or authoritarian rules, with protestors in 
Texas equating masks to “medical tyranny.”69 
 
“A lot of people take their liberty quite seriously — they prefer to have education 
and make informed decisions, as opposed to a mandate,” said Mike Kuckelman, the 
chairman of the Kansas Republican Party. “This just seems heavy-handed and 
unnecessary for large portions of our state.”70 
 
Furthermore, attacks against mask wearers often had connotations that mask wearing is 
unmanly or a show of weakness. In an American context, there is little more manly than guns and 
the military. Even for the few Republican leaders that decided to go against their President’s anti-
mask narrative, they did so by talking about masks through a security frame. For example, Doug 
Ducey, the Republican governor of Arizona, asked for people to “arm [themselves] with a mask.”71 
When Liz Cheney, Republican Representative of Wyoming, urged people to wear a mask, she 
tweeted a photo of her dad in cowboy attire, captioned with #realmenwearmasks.72 Brien Kemp, 
 






Republican governor of Georgia, told people to wear masks by posting a selfie “wearing a mask 
decorated with the University of Georgia’s bulldog mascot,”73 with school sport mascots being 
another sign of masculinity and virility.  
 
Framing does not have to be partisan, and I endeavoured to keep my analysis apolitical. 
However, in the context of strong partisanship in the US, it must be acknowledged that the 
Republican party has historically been pro-military, and has used security frames to present its 
solutions as the most appropriate. There is nothing inherently wrong with a security frame, whether 
in general or specifically when talking about the coronavirus. Still, with the pandemic, partisanship 
had a strong impact on the sort of frames politicians at all levels used, and on how people perceived 










Early framing is critical, with Dr. Robert Redfield, president of the CDC, paraphrasing 
Aristotle to explain that “when you put a message on a blank slate, that first message is critical. 
When you want to rechannel a message, it’s always a problem.”74 Framing in the US was critical 
because it did not just determine how regular people viewed the situation, but it also had a 
tremendous impact on how the administration itself viewed the crisis and its role to play. It could 
have been fine if the government tried to downplay it publicly, whilst assembling a capable task 
force and building a resilient stockpile behind the scenes. Instead, the Trump’s administration 
framing was a good indication and reflection of the administration’s tangible actions.  
It is of little surprise that the pandemic in the US was framed through a security lens. There 
were elements of the way American society and politics function that oriented the US toward a 
security frame, such as the need to use the army for manpower as there is no other large federal 
agency that would have been up to the task, the lack of social security in the US, and the militarism 
already prevalent in the US. It was also visible in the way news outlets compared coronavirus 
deaths to war deaths. The New York Times wrote that the coronavirus “killed close to twice as 
many Americans as the wars in Vietnam, Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan combined,”75 and countless 
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There were also elements specific to the Trump presidency, that were dependent on 
Trump’s personality and leadership style. I think any president would have used the Defense 
Production Act, would have sent the US Navy hospital ships, and would have deployed the 
National Guard to build and staff field hospitals in hard hit areas. Any US president would also 
likely have made comparisons in speeches between the pandemic and wars. However, other 
presidents may have staffed their pandemic response leadership team differently and included 
more health experts, or would not have placed blame as much on foreign entities. As has been 
mentioned numerous times in this paper, framing is both a reflection of personal understanding of 
a crisis, and a strategic choice to promote a particular agenda. Pinpointing how much framing is 
the result of a country’s political scene versus the result of a specific politician is a challenging 
task, and there is no general answer for it. An in-depth analysis of each case helps shed light on 
that, which in our case has shown that for countries like the US and France, framing was heavily 
dependent on the individual in charge.  
 
A socio-economic framing and response are critical, as tackling the coronavirus and other 
pandemics requires not just a medical response, but also a broader social and economic response. 
There is no use asking people to stop going to work if they are not given an alternative source of 
income to keep on buying groceries and paying bills. There is no use issuing mask mandates if the 
government does not also educate people on the reasoning and science behind wearing masks, or 
if people are not given the financial help to buy enough masks. There is no use in closing down 
schools if parents are not given the support to care for their children who now must stay home, and 
if school systems and families are not given the support to continue education online.  
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The people most likely to fight against coronavirus-related measures are those who have 
the most to lose from them. The person who wants schools to re-open despite the risks will be the 
working parent who cannot take a day off work to care for their children, or the parent who cannot 
afford internet for their children to access online school. The person who wants stores to re-open 
will be the one who needs that pay-check to make it till the following month. This was true whether 
applied to retail workers in the US or farmers in India.  
The government cannot just ask for people to follow the rules. People need to be given 
incentives or good reasons to do so. Otherwise, relations between people and the government 
breakdown. It is a well-known mantra in public health that the best way to get people to adopt 
healthy behaviour is not to impose it or even attempt to regulate it, but to simply make that 
behaviour the easiest and cheapest behaviour. Doing this however requires a population-centric 
approach, one that considers community involvement and does not assume that the government 
can take care of things on its own with its near-unlimited resources.  
People also need to see how their efforts pay out, and the government needs to keep 
updating the people on the successes of their policies, so that people can see that their efforts are 
not in vain. Unrests against lockdowns are a result of a communication and accountability failure. 
Most people were willing to commit to early lockdowns, but after months of no improvement of 
the sanitary condition, it becomes harder to justify more efforts if the results are not there.  
 
 
A socio-economic frame may not guarantee success for a socio-economic issue, but a 
security frame is much more likely to lead to poor outcomes, as the security frame signals that the 
government misunderstood the core of the issue. It remains important for civil society to scrutinise 
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politicians’ words not just to criticise them, but more crucially to peer inside that politician’s mind 
to understand and predict the policies that will follow. Holding the media accountable to not 
overdramatise issues and apply security frames to secure greater viewership will also ensure that 
security frames are not wrongly applied.  
Arriving at a situation where no government in the world even considers solely adopting a 
security frame for a pandemic will take time. Even the director-general of the World Health 
Organisation talked about being “at war” against the coronavirus and encouraged countries to 
“fight, fight hard, fight like hell.”76 It is promising however that many countries did not opt for a 
security frame, and instead understood that tackling the pandemic would require a population-
centric approach. Issues of framing and of corresponding policies are becoming very prevalent in 
other topics, such as general policing, drug policies, homelessness, immigration, and even 
insecurity abroad. Security frames have their rightful place for many topics, including in 
pandemics when they are needed to make the crisis relatable to the broader public. However, the 
evidence is increasingly pointing out that many socio-economic issues previously framed as 
security issues would have been better served had they been framed and treated as socio-economic 
issues from the start, this pandemic included.  
 
“When the story is finally written, we’ll come to understand that tens of thousands 




76 Adhanom, ‘WHO Director General’s Remarks at the G20 Extraordinary Leaders’ Summit on COVID-19’. 




Bibliography for the thesis 
Note: These are only the citations for the written part of the thesis, for this document. 
 
Adhanom, Tedros. ‘WHO Director General’s Remarks at the G20 Extraordinary Leaders’ Summit on 
COVID-19’. World Health Organization, 26 March 2020. https://www.who.int/director-
general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-remarks-at-the-g20-extraordinary-leaders-summit-
on-covid-19---26-march-2020. 
Baker, Peter. ‘For Trump, Coronavirus Proves to Be an Enemy He Can’t Tweet Away’. The New York 
Times, 8 March 2020, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/08/us/politics/trump-
coronavirus.html. 
———. ‘Trump, in Philadelphia, Says He “Up-Played” the Virus, Then Downplays It’. The New York 
Times, 16 September 2020, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/us/politics/trump-
town-hall.html. 
Bennhold, Katrin, and Melissa Eddy. ‘Merkel Gives Germans a Hard Truth About the Coronavirus’. The 
New York Times, 11 March 2020, sec. World. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/world/europe/coronavirus-merkel-germany.html. 
Bosman, Julie. ‘Amid Virus Surge, Republicans Abruptly Urge Masks Despite Trump’s Resistance’. The 
New York Times, 1 July 2020, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/us/coronavirus-
masks.html. 
CDC. ‘COVID-19 and Your Health’. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 11 February 2020. 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/from-other-countries.html. 
United States Census Bureau. ‘Census Bureau Releases New Report on Veterans’, 2 June 2020. 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2020/veterans-report.html. 
 85 
Center for Systems Science and Engineering. ‘COVID-19 Map’. Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource 
Center. Accessed 19 November 2020. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html. 
Cooper, Helene, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. ‘Navy Hospital Ship Reaches New York. But It’s Not Made 
to Contain Coronavirus.’ The New York Times, 30 March 2020, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/us/politics/coronavirus-comfort-hospital-ship-new-
york.html. 
Corkery, Michael, and Annie Karni. ‘Trump Administration Restricts Entry Into U.S. From China’. The 
New York Times, 31 January 2020, sec. Business. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/business/china-travel-coronavirus.html. 
Lowy Institute. ‘Covid Performance Index’, 9 January 2021. 
https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/covid-performance/#region. 
YouGov. ‘COVID-19 Public Monitor’, 9 January 2021. https://yougov.co.uk/covid-19. 
Digital Communications Division. ‘HHS Organizational Chart’. Text. HHS.gov, 24 October 2008. 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/orgchart/index.html. 
Entman, Robert M. ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’. Journal of Communication 
43, no. 4 (1993): 51–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x. 
Gerster, Jane. ‘Trudeau Says “the Front Line Is Everywhere,” but Should We Compare Coronavirus to 
War?’ Global News, 17 April 2020. https://globalnews.ca/news/6793794/coronavirus-pandemic-
war/. 
Grady, Denise, and Roni Caryn Rabin. ‘195 Quarantined in California After Fleeing Coronavirus 
Epicenter’. The New York Times, 31 January 2020, sec. Health. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/health/quarantine-coronavirus.html. 
Haberman, Maggie. ‘Trump Admits Downplaying the Virus Knowing It Was “Deadly Stuff”’. The New 
York Times, 9 September 2020, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/us/politics/woodward-trump-book-virus.html. 
 86 
Haberman, Maggie, and Katie Thomas. ‘Trump Calls His Illness “a Blessing From God”’. The New York 
Times, 8 October 2020, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/us/politics/trump-
coronavirus-blessing.html. 
Haberman, Maggie, and Noah Weiland. ‘Inside the Coronavirus Response: A Case Study in the White 
House Under Trump’. The New York Times, 16 March 2020, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/us/politics/kushner-trump-coronavirus.html. 
Horsley, Scott. ‘Guns in America, By the Numbers’. NPR, 5 January 2016. 
https://www.npr.org/2016/01/05/462017461/guns-in-america-by-the-numbers?t=1617278521975. 
Jonung, Lars. ‘Sweden’s Constitution Decides Its Exceptional Covid-19 Policy’. Vox EU, 18 June 2020. 
https://voxeu.org/article/sweden-s-constitution-decides-its-exceptional-covid-19-policy. 
Lal, Arush, Ngozi A Erondu, David L Heymann, Githinji Gitahi, and Robert Yates. ‘Fragmented Health 
Systems in COVID-19: Rectifying the Misalignment between Global Health Security and 
Universal Health Coverage’. The Lancet 397, no. 10268 (January 2021): 61–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32228-5. 
Lecheler, Sophie. ‘Framing Effects in Political Communication’. In Political Science, by Sophie 
Lecheler. Oxford University Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0269. 
Lipton, Eric, Zolan Kanno-Youngs, and Helene Cooper. ‘Trump Slowly Enlisting More Agencies in 
“Whole of Government” Response to Virus’. The New York Times, 17 March 2020, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/politics/coronavirus-government-army-corps.html. 
Löfven, Stefan. ‘Statement of Government Policy, 08 September 2020’. Government Offices of Sweden, 
8 September 2020. https://www.government.se/speeches/2020/09/statement-of-government-
policy/. 
Lopez, C. Todd. ‘Comfort, Javits Center Open Care to COVID-19 Patients’. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 




Mateus, Ana LP, Harmony E Otete, Charles R Beck, Gayle P Dolan, and Jonathan S Nguyen-Van-Tam. 
‘Effectiveness of Travel Restrictions in the Rapid Containment of Human Influenza: A 
Systematic Review’. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 92, no. 12 (1 December 2014): 
868-880D. https://doi.org/10.2471/BLT.14.135590. 
The White House. ‘National Security Council’, 21 January 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/. 
Onishi, Norimitsu. ‘Chaos in Europe, and Anger, Over U.S. Travel Ban to Curb Coronavirus’. The New 
York Times, 12 March 2020, sec. World. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/world/europe/europe-coronavirus-travel-ban.html. 
Ota, Hiroyuki. ‘Wartime Japan and COVID-19 Conformity Offer Some Parallels’. The Asahi Shimbun, 
11 August 2020. http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13626292. 
Person, Vox First. ‘I Was Sent to Be Treated for Covid-19 at the Javits Center. Here’s What It’s like.’ 
Vox, 13 April 2020. https://www.vox.com/first-person/2020/4/13/21218982/coronavirus-covid-
19-new-york-javits-center-hospital. 
Qiu, Linda. ‘Analyzing the Patterns in Trump’s Falsehoods About Coronavirus’. The New York Times, 28 
March 2020, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-
factcheck.html. 
Qiu, Linda, Bill Marsh, and Jon Huang. ‘The President vs. the Experts: How Trump Played Down the 
Coronavirus’. The New York Times, 18 March 2020, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/03/18/us/trump-coronavirus-statements-timeline.html. 
Rathje, Steve. ‘The Power of Framing: It’s Not What You Say, It’s How You Say It’. the Guardian, 20 
July 2017. http://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2017/jul/20/the-power-of-framing-
its-not-what-you-say-its-how-you-say-it. 
Rogers, Katie. ‘Trump Now Claims He Always Knew the Coronavirus Would Be a Pandemic’. The New 
York Times, 17 March 2020, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/politics/trump-
coronavirus.html. 
 88 
Roser, Max, and Mohamed Nagdy. ‘Military Spending’. Our World in Data, 2013. 
https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending. 
Scheufele, Dietram. ‘Framing as a Theory of Media Effects’. Journal of Communication, no. Winter 1999 
(1999). 
Schwirtz, Michael. ‘The 1,000-Bed Comfort Was Supposed to Aid New York. It Has 20 Patients.’ The 
New York Times, 2 April 2020, sec. New York. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/nyregion/ny-coronavirus-usns-comfort.html. 
Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, Andrew Jacobs, Noah Weil, and Sharon LaFraniere. ‘The Surging Coronavirus 
Finds a Federal Leadership Vacuum’, 10 January 2021. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/us/politics/coronavirus-surge-trump.html? 
Thompson, Derek. ‘What’s Behind South Korea’s COVID-19 Exceptionalism?’ The Atlantic, 6 May 
2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/whats-south-koreas-secret/611215/. 
Trudeau, Justin. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Updating Canadians on the Modelling of the COVID-19 
Situation’. Prime Minister of Canada, 4 September 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/04/09/prime-ministers-remarks-updating-canadians-
modelling-covid-19-situation. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Speech to the House of Commons on Canada’s Response to the COVID-19 
Pandemic’. Prime Minister of Canada, 11 April 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/04/11/prime-ministers-speech-house-commons-canadas-
response-covid-19-pandemic. 
World Health Organization. ‘Timeline of WHO’s Response to COVID-19’. WHO. Accessed 19 





Note: these are the citations for the index, which can be found in the Excel file 
Time. ‘As Coronavirus Spreads, Trump Refashions Himself as a Wartime President’. Accessed 
18 February 2021. https://time.com/5806657/donald-trump-coronavirus-war-china/. 
Government of the United States. ‘Remarks by President Trump and Members of the 
Coronavirus Task Force in Meeting with Pharmaceutical Companies’. White House, 2 
March 2020. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-members-coronavirus-task-force-meeting-pharmaceutical-companies/. 
———. ‘Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus 
Task Force in Press Briefing’, 15 March 2020. 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-
president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-2/. 
———. ‘Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus 
Task Force in Press Conference’. White House. Accessed 14 March 2021. 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-
president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-conference/. 
Pence, Mike. ‘We Need the American People’s Help to Fight Coronavirus Now’. USA TODAY, 
18 March 2020. https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/03/18/coronavirus-mike-
pence-how-to-fight-covid-19-2-weeks-column/5070209002/. 
‘Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task 




Washington Post. ‘These Quotes Show How Trump’s Response to the Coronavirus Has Changed 
over Time’. Accessed 18 February 2021. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/trump-coronavirus-statements/. 
Trump, Donald. ‘President Trump’s Letter to World Health Organization’. The White House, 18 
May 2020. https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo138150/Tedros-Letter.pdf. 
———. ‘Remarks by President Trump in a Press Briefing on COVID-19 Testing’. White House, 
27 February 2020. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-press-briefing-covid-19-testing/. 
———. ‘Remarks by President Trump in a Press Briefing on COVID-19 Testing’, White House. 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-
briefing-covid-19-testing/. 
‘Trump Says Coronavirus Worse “attack” than Pearl Harbor’. BBC News, 7 May 2020, sec. US 
& Canada. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52568405. 
‘Who’s on the U.S. Coronavirus Task Force’. The New York Times, 29 February 2020, sec. 
Health. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/health/Trump-coronavirus-taskforce.html.  
 91 
Japan Index 
Abe, Shinzo. ‘[COVID-19] Press Conference by the Prime Minister’. Prime Minister of Japan 
and His Cabinet, 14 March 2020. 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/202003/_00001.html. 
———. ‘[COVID-19] Press Conference by the Prime Minister’. Prime Minister of Japan and 
His Cabinet, 28 March 2020. 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/202003/_00002.html. 
———. ‘[COVID-19] Press Conference by the Prime Minister Regarding the Novel 
Coronavirus’, 14 May 2020. 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/202005/_00002.html. 
———. ‘[COVID-19] Press Conference by the Prime Minister Regarding the Novel 
Coronavirus’. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 25 May 2020. 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/202005/_00003.html. 
———. ‘Headquarters for Healthcare Policy’. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 27 
March 2020. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/202003/_00044.html. 
———. ‘Press Conference Regarding the Declaration of a State of Emergency’. Prime Minister 
of Japan and His Cabinet, 6 April 2020. 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/202004/_00005.html. 
———. ‘Second Meeting of the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters’. Prime Minister of 
Japan and His Cabinet, 31 January 2020. 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/202001/_00037.html. 
 92 
———. ‘Second Meeting with Companies Contributing to the Increased Production of Personal 
Protective Equipment and Other Supplies’. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 16 
April 2020. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/202004/_00023.html. 
ANI. ‘Japan Confirms 2,431 New Covid-19 Cases as More SDF Personnel Deployed to Help 
Combat Surge’. ANI, 15 December 2020. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/japan-
confirms-2431-new-covid-19-cases-as-more-sdf-personnel-deployed-to-help-combat-
surge20201215224144/. 
Cabinet Secretariat. ‘COVID-19 Information and Resouces’. COVID-19 Information and 
Resources. Accessed 20 February 2021. https://corona.go.jp/en/. 
Denyer, Simon. ‘Japan Sets aside $22 Million to Buff Government’s Global Image amid 
Pandemic Struggles’. The Washington Post, 15 April 2020. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan-coronavirus-image-
abe/2020/04/15/73bf1dee-7f00-11ea-84c2-0792d8591911_story.html. 
Government of Japan. ‘Basic Policies for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control by the 
Government of Japan’. COVID-19 Information and Resources, 25 May 2020. 
https://corona.go.jp/en/news/pdf/basic_policy_20200531.pdf. 
———. ‘Expert Meeting on the Novel Coronavirus Disease Control: Analysis of the Response 
to the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Recommendations’. COVID-19 Information and 
Resources, 4 May 2020. 
https://corona.go.jp/en/toppage/pdf/analysis_and_recommendations_20200509.pdf. 
 93 
———. ‘新型コロナウイルス感染症対策専門家会議の開催について’, 14 February 2020. 
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/novel_coronavirus/senmonkakaigi/konkyo.pdf. 
———. ‘新型コロナウイルス感染症対策本部幹事会の構成員の官職の指定について’, 30 
January 2020. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/novel_coronavirus/kanjikai/konkyo.pdf. 
Johnston, Eric. ‘Legal Revisions Would Add Weight to Japan’s COVID-19 Response’. The 
Japan Times, 6 January 2021. 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/06/national/japan-coronavirus-response/. 
Kato, Hisashi. ‘The Self Defense Forces and Japan’s COVID-19 Response’. Tokyo Review 
(blog), 21 April 2020. https://www.tokyoreview.net/2020/04/self-defense-forces-japan-
covid-19/. 
Kyodo News. ‘82% Say Gov’t Should Compensate for Business Suspension: Kyodo Poll’. 
Kyodo News, 13 April 2020. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/04/eea437e79b17-
urgent-public-dissatisfied-with-abes-response-to-virus-outbreak-kyodo-poll.html. 
Ministry of Defense of Japan. ‘Japan Self-Defense Forces Engagement in Response to COVID-
19’, 10 April 2020. https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/exc/area/docs/2020/20200417_j-
fra_gaiyo-1en.pdf. 
Ministy of Foreign Affairs of Japan. ‘Novel Coronavirus Infection: Offer of the Stockpiled 
ASEF Equipment to Asian Countries’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 14 February 
2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/page4e_001178.html. 
Nishimura, Yasutoshi. ‘How Japan Beat Coronavirus Without Lockdowns’. Wall Street Journal. 
7 July 2020. https://corona.go.jp/en/toppage/pdf/wsj_opinion_20200707.pdf. 
 94 
NHK. ‘Report from the Front Line to Prevent the Spread of New Coronavirus Infection’, 15 
April 2020. https://www.nhk.or.jp/special/plus/articles/20200414/index.html. 
Sasaki, Fumiko. ‘Japan’s Fight against Covid-19 Hinges on Old “System of Irresponsibility”’. 
Text. The Straits Times, 30 June 2020. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/japans-fight-
against-covid-19-hinges-on-old-system-of-irresponsibility. 
Suga, Yoshihide. ‘[COVID-19] Declaration of a State of Emergency in Response to the Novel 
Coronavirus Disease’. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 7 January 2021. 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/ongoingtopics/_00038.html. 
Yuko, Aizawa. ‘Did the State of Emergency Declaration Come Too Late?’ NHK World, 15 






AFP. ‘War-Hardened General to Lead Canada’s Covid-19 Vaccination Effort’. France 24, 27 
November 2020. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201127-war-hardened-general-
to-lead-canada-s-covid-19-vaccination-effort. 
Department of Justice of Canada. ‘Government of Canada’s Response to COVID-19’, 27 March 
2020. https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/covid.html. 
Gerster, Jane. ‘Trudeau Says “the Front Line Is Everywhere,” but Should We Compare 
Coronavirus to War?’ Global News, 17 April 2020. 
https://globalnews.ca/news/6793794/coronavirus-pandemic-war/. 
Goldenberg, Adam, Meghan Hillstrom, Carolyn Lee, Lauren Soubolsky, and Laurence Landry-
Plouffe. ‘COVID-19: Emergency Measures Tracker’. McCarthy Tétrault, 5 March 2021. 
https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/articles/covid-19-emergency-measures-tracker. 
Government of Canada. ‘Military Response to COVID-19’. aem, 6 October 2020. 
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/campaigns/covid-19-military-
response.html. 
Office of the Prime Minister of Canada. ‘Prime Minister Creates Committee on COVID-19’. 
Prime Minister of Canada, 4 March 2020. https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-
releases/2020/03/04/prime-minister-creates-committee-covid-19. 
Trudeau, Justin. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Announcing Canada’s Plan to Mobilize Industry to 




———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Announcing the COVID-19 Economic Response Plan’. 
Prime Minister of Canada, 18 March 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/03/18/prime-ministers-remarks-announcing-covid-
19-economic-response-plan. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks on Additional Support for Small Businesses during 
COVID-19’. Prime Minister of Canada, 16 April 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/04/16/prime-ministers-remarks-additional-support-
small-businesses-during-covid. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks on Canada’s Response to COVID-19’. Prime Minister of 
Canada, 3 November 2020. https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/03/11/prime-ministers-
remarks-canadas-response-covid-19. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks on New Support for COVID-19 Medical Research and 
Vaccine Development’. Prime Minister of Canada, 23 April 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/04/23/prime-ministers-remarks-new-support-covid-
19-medical-research-and-vaccine. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks on Support for Indigenous Businesses’. Prime Minister of 
Canada, 18 April 2020. https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/04/18/prime-ministers-
remarks-support-indigenous-businesses. 
 97 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Thanking Workers and All Canadians for Helping Their 
Communities during the COVID-19 Situation’. Prime Minister of Canada, 4 May 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/04/05/prime-ministers-remarks-thanking-workers-
and-all-canadians-helping-their. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks to Workers and Business Owners Facing Challenges Due to 
COVID-19’. Prime Minister of Canada, 30 March 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/03/30/prime-ministers-remarks-workers-and-
business-owners-facing-challenges-due. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Updating Canadians and Thanking Them for Helping Fight 
COVID-19’. Prime Minister of Canada, 22 March 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/03/22/prime-ministers-remarks-updating-
canadians-and-thanking-them-helping-fight. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Updating Canadians on Supplies and Support for Shelters’. 
Prime Minister of Canada, 4 April 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/04/04/prime-ministers-remarks-updating-
canadians-supplies-and-support-shelters. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Updating Canadians on the COVID-19 Situation’. Prime 
Minister of Canada, 26 March 2020. https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/03/26/prime-
ministers-remarks-updating-canadians-covid-19-situation. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Updating Canadians on the Modelling of the COVID-19 




———. ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks Updating Canadians on the Rollout of the Canada 
Emergency Response Benefit’. Prime Minister of Canada, 4 January 2020. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2020/04/01/prime-ministers-remarks-updating-
canadians-rollout-canada-emergency. 
———. ‘Prime Minister’s Speech to the House of Commons on Canada’s Response to the 








Carlson, Johan. ‘The Swedish Strategy about COVID-19’. Public Health Agency of Sweden, 3 
July 2020. http://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-
sweden/communicable-disease-control/covid-19/covid-19--the-swedish-strategy/. 
Government of Sweden. ‘Key Acts and Ordinances Entering into Force in Mid-2020 - 
Government.Se’. Government Offices of Sweden, 2 July 2020. 
https://www.government.se/information-material/2020/07/key-acts-and-ordinances-
entering-into-force-in-mid-2020/. 
Hultqvist, Peter. ‘Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist’s Speech at UK NATO Heads of Mission’s 
Forum’. Government Offices of Sweden, 15 June 2020. 
https://www.government.se/speeches/2020/06/defence-minister-peter-hultqvists-speech-at-
uk-nato-heads-of-missions-forum-monday-15-june-2020/. 
Jansson, Lasse. ‘Corona-Infected Patients Can Now Be Transported by Military Helicopter’. 
Swedish Armed Forces, 20 April 2020. 
https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/news/2020/04/corona-infected-patients-can-now-be-
transported-by-military-helicopter/. 
Löfven, Stefan. ‘Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation, 22 March 2020’. Government Offices 
of Sweden, 23 March 2020. https://www.government.se/speeches/2020/03/prime-ministers-
address-to-the-nation-22-march-2020/. 
 100 
———. ‘Statement of Government Policy, 08 September 2020’. Government Offices of 
Sweden, 8 September 2020. https://www.government.se/speeches/2020/09/statement-of-
government-policy/. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden. ‘The Government’s Statement of Foreign Policy 2020’. 
Text. Government Offices of Sweden. Regeringen och Regeringskansliet, 2 December 2020. 
https://www.government.se/speeches/2020/02/2020-statement-of-foreign-policy/. 
Ministry of Defence of Sweden. ‘Speech by Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist at Video 
Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers (Defence)’. Government Offices of Sweden, 6 
April 2020. https://www.government.se/speeches/2020/04/speech-by-minister-for-defence-
peter-hultqvist-at-video-conference-of-foreign-affairs-ministers-defence/. 
Ministry of Employment of Sweden. ‘Eva Nordmark Takes Part in EU Meeting on Measures for 
Employment and Businesses in Light of COVID-19’. Government Offices of Sweden, 20 
March 2020. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2020/03/eva-nordmark-takes-part-
in-eu-meeting-on-measures-for-employment-and-businesses-in-light-of-covid-19/. 
Ministry of Finance of Sweden. ‘Additional Amending Budget Due to the Coronavirus’. 
Government Offices of Sweden, 11 March 2020. https://www.government.se/press-
releases/2020/03/additional-amending-budget-due-to-the-coronavirus/. 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs of Sweden. ‘COVID-19 Act Allows Stronger 
Communicable Disease Control Measures - Government.Se’. Government Offices of 
Sweden, 18 January 2021. https://www.government.se/articles/2021/01/covid-19-act-
allows-stronger-communicable-disease-control-measures/. 
 101 
———. ‘Work in the Areas of Public Health, Medical Care, Social Care and Social Insurance 
with Regard to the COVID-19 Virus - Government.Se’. Government Offices of Sweden, 20 
March 2020. https://www.government.se/articles/2020/03/s-work-in-the-areas-of-public-
health-medical-care-social-care-and-social-insurance-with-regard-to-the-covid-19-virus/. 
Ministry of Justice of Sweden. ‘Ordinance on a Prohibition against Holding Public Gatherings 
and Events’. Government Offices of Sweden, 13 March 2020. 
https://www.government.se/articles/2020/03/ordinance-on-a-prohibition-against-holding-
public-gatherings-and-events/. 
Prime Minister’s Office of Sweden. ‘Joint Statement – Rule of Law in the Context of the Covid-
19 Crisis - Government.Se’. Government Offices of Sweden, 8 April 2020. 
https://www.government.se/articles/2020/04/joint-statement--rule-of-law-in-the-context-of-
the-covid-19-crisis/. 
———. ‘Strategy in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic’. Government Offices of Sweden, 6 
April 2020. https://www.government.se/articles/2020/04/strategy-in-response-to-the-covid-
19-pandemic/. 
Public Health Agency of Sweden. ‘The Public Health Agency of Sweden’s Work with COVID-
19’. Public Health Agency of Sweden, 9 November 2020. 
http://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/communicable-
disease-control/covid-19/the-public-health-agency-of-swedens-work-with-covid-19/. 
Wirenhed, Karen, and Keith Foster. ‘Swedish Military Helps Combat Coronavirus - Radio 
Sweden’. Sveriges Radio, 21 March 2020. https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/7435161.  
 102 
France Index 
elysee.fr. ‘Caractère vital de la recherche scientifique et nécessité d’investir massivement pour le 




‘Communiqué_Le Ministère Des Armées Soutient et Finance Le Projet de Test de Dépistage Du 




elysee.fr. ‘Conseil de défense et Conseil des ministres du 4 mars 2020’, 4 March 2020. 
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/03/04/conseil-de-defense-et-conseil-des-
ministres-du-4-mars-2020. 
elysee.fr. ‘Conseil de défense et Conseil des ministres du 29 février 2020 consacrés au 
coronavirus COVID-19.’, 29 February 2020. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-
macron/2020/02/29/conseil-de-defense-et-conseil-des-ministres-du-29-fevrier-2020-
consacres-au-coronavirus-covid-19. 
elysee.fr. ‘Coronavirus COVID-19 : visite du Président Emmanuel Macron au centre de crise du 




elysee.fr. ‘Coronavirus : déclaration des chefs d’État et de gouvernement du G7.’, 16 March 
2020. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/03/16/coronavirus-declaration-des-
chefs-detat-et-de-gouvernement-du-g7. 
Vie publique.fr. ‘Covid-19 : les textes publiés au Journal officiel’, 12 March 2021. 
https://www.vie-publique.fr/covid-19-les-textes-publies-au-journal-officiel. 
elysee.fr. ‘Découvrez Les Visages de La France Unie Face à La Crise’, 24 April 2020. 
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/04/24/decouvrez-les-visages-de-la-france-
unie-face-a-la-crise. 
elysee.fr. ‘Face au Coronavirus, mobilisés pour protéger les Français. Regardez la vidéo.’, 6 
March 2020. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/03/06/face-au-coronavirus-
mobilises-pour-proteger-les-francais-regardez-la-video. 
elysee.fr. ‘Initiative franco-allemande pour la relance européenne face à la crise du coronavirus’, 
18 May 2020. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/05/18/initiative-franco-
allemande-pour-la-relance-europeenne-face-a-la-crise-du-coronavirus. 
Macron, Emmanuel. ‘À Mulhouse, aux côtés des femmes et des hommes mobilisés en première 
ligne pour protéger les Français du COVID-19.’ elysee.fr, 25 March 2020. 
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/03/25/a-mulhouse-aux-cotes-des-femmes-et-
des-hommes-mobilises-en-premiere-ligne-pour-proteger-les-francais-du-covid-19. 
———. ‘Adresse aux Français’. elysee.fr, 28 October 2020. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-
macron/2020/10/28/adresse-aux-francais-28-octobre. 
 104 
———. ‘Adresse aux Français, 12 mars 2020’. elysee.fr, 12 March 2020. 
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/03/12/adresse-aux-francais. 
———. ‘Adresse aux Français, 13 avril 2020’. elysee.fr, 13 April 2020. 
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/04/13/adresse-aux-francais-13-avril-2020. 
———. ‘Adresse aux Français, 16 mars 2020’. elysee.fr, 16 March 2020. 
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/03/16/adresse-aux-francais-covid19. 
———. ‘Grâce au travail, célébré en ce 1er mai, la Nation tient.’ elysee.fr, 1 May 2020. 
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/05/01/grace-au-travail-celebre-en-ce-1er-
mai-la-nation-tient-ecoutez-le-message-du-president-emmanuel-macron. 
———. ‘Santé : investir dans notre souveraineté.’ elysee.fr, 16 June 2016. 
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/06/16/sante-investir-dans-notre-
souverainete-visite-sanofi-pasteur. 
Ministry of Armed Forces of France. ‘Le Ministère Des Armées Soutient et Finance Le Projet de 




———. ‘Opération Résilience’, 27 April 2020. 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/operations/operation-resilience. 
elysee.fr. ‘Pour protéger les Français du COVID-19, unité et réactivité. Réunion au Centre 




Vie publique.fr. ‘Qu’est-ce que l’état d’urgence sanitaire ?’, 16 February 2021. https://www.vie-
publique.fr/fiches/273947-quest-ce-que-letat-durgence-sanitaire. 
elysee.fr. ‘Réunion de la « Task force Économie » face au COVID-19.’, 19 March 2020. 
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/03/19/reunion-de-la-task-force-economie-
face-au-covid-19. 
